Just a few hours until the start of the first round, and I’ve got some last-minute thoughts to disseminate.  Those of you who visit consistently will know I am firmly in the trade-down camp.  However, today I’ll provide some more details and run through a few scenarios.

First, though, I want to make clear that, despite the evidence that the draft is mostly luck, it is DEFINITELY POSSIBLE to “win the draft”.  While individual selections show very little evidence of team skill, maneuvering through the draft to maximize value clearly requires talent.  That’s why you see so much misinformation close to the draft.  You want the rest of the league to believe that you really might take everyone; doing so maximizes your trade leverage.  So for the next three days and especially after the first round, it’s not necessarily about “who” the Eagles select; it’s about “how” and “where”.  I’ll come back to that after the draft and take a run at evaluating the overall “value” the Eagles came out with.

So what will the Eagles do tonight?

First I want to mention that I think the Eagles will choose TWO players tonight, meaning the team will trade up from #35 to get back into the first round.  Between 20-32 there will be some very good Safeties and CB options, and I think Howie makes a play for his favorite somewhere in that area.

As far as the top of the round goes:

The Eagles have been linked by “sources” to close to a dozen players.  This is very much a purposeful misinformation campaign by Howie.  It means he wants to trade down.  I’ve shown pretty clearly the merits of “tiered” drafting, as well as the relative value within the top 15 picks.  Basically the top 15 is its own “round” of the draft, with far and away the heaviest concentration of impact players.  However, within the top 15, there is surprisingly little difference between picks.  The only major note is that QBs and OTs go in the top 5, so you will not find equal value at those positions from 10-15.

In my opinion, the top “tier” this year is around 9 players deep, with Joeckel the only real standout of the group (and even he isn’t a perfect prospect).  Judging by what I’ve seen in the media, I thinks it’s a safe bet that Howie is viewing the first round the same way.  Consequently, the “correct” thing to do would by to trade down but remain in the top 9 picks, picking up extra compensation while guaranteeing you still get a “top tier” player.

The Trade Scenarios:

1) Eric Fisher is available at 4.  This case, while it’ll be tempting for the Eagles to draft Fisher themselves, offers the best potential trade compensation.  Fisher is reportedly rated the best tackle in the draft, and some are speculating he may actually go #1 to Andy and the Chiefs.  If he falls, it should not be difficult for the Eagles to find 2-3 teams willing to bid up the value of the #4 pick.  Potential partners would be Arizona (#7), Miami (#12), San Diego (#11).  Of these teams, only Arizona would allow the Eagles to stay in the top 9.

2) Eric Fisher is gone.  In this case, while the ultimate value of the #4 spot might be lower, the interest will actually be greater (not a direct supply-demand-value result).  With Fisher taken, Lane Johnson remains as the only top OT.  In this situation, I believe the same teams as above will be interested, with the Lions (#5) joining the group as well.  Sliding down one spot would be particularly attractive for the Eagles, as it really would be “free” compensation, assuming the team didn’t rate Johnson well above every other prospect.

3) The Double Trade.  I’m quickly talking  myself into this scenario, though admittedly it’s wishful thinking.  Start with scenario 2, where the Eagles trade down one pick to #5.  The team could then call the Jets, who are in desperate need of an offensive weapon, and ransom Tavon Austin.  In a perfect world, they’d acquire the Jets #9 pick.  This scenario would bring the Eagles at least a few extra picks and allow the team to take whichever “top tier” player is still available.  This is what I’ll be rooting for.

4) The Deep Drop.  I did a post a while ago that discussed why perennial contenders should trade up in the draft more often.  The curse of being a very good team consistently is that you never get to choose in the top 15, limiting your ability to add impact players at cheap prices.  These teams typically resort to free agency, which forces the Winner’s Curse upon them and depletes their cap room.  While it’s risky to trade up that far (you have to give up a lot of pick value), I’d argue that it’s worth it, provided you are selecting a “top tier” guy in return.  There are rumors that both the Ravens and 49ers are interested in moving way up, and to me that makes a lot of sense.  However, I think it’s unlikely they’ll be able to provide enough compensation to come all the way up to the Eagles pick at #4.  Don’t be surprised to see one of them picking between 10-15 though.

So who are the Eagles going to take when they actually do pick?

The short answer is: I have no idea.  I do think there are some guys to keep in mind though.  I’ll run through the potentials with some quick thoughts on each.

Dion Jordan – A very popular “mock pick” for the Eagles.  He’d provide an OLB pass rusher for the new defense and played for Chip at Oregon.  I don’t think he’s as likely to be the pick as many are suggesting.  Despite his athleticism and speed, his production wasn’t great.  Additionally, while I do believe the Eagles are drafting “best available”, Dion doesn’t exactly fill a glaring hole.

Star Lotulelei – I’ve been high on him since November, though his stock has certainly dropped since then.  The key to him is his versatility, as he can play all 3 positions on the D-line in the 3-4.  If the Eagles trade down, I think he’s a likely pick.  He’s a bit old for a prospect (he’ll be 24 before the season), but Chip has a clear preference for versatility, making Star a top target.

Ziggy Ansah – Covered him a bit a couple of weeks ago.  Not getting much Eagles action in the mock drafts, but I can’t ignore him.  Kelly has made it clear he values “athletic freakism” and there is no better example of that in this draft than Ziggy.  Additionally he can likely play both the 5-tech on the d-line and the Rush OLB.  Howie might get sold on his “upside”, which is among the best in the draft if you listen to all the “experts”.  The fact that he HASN’T been strongly linked to the Eagles makes me think they really like him.

Dee Milliner – Health issues may be scaring some teams, but I still see Milliner as one of the better risk/reward prospects available.  I’d be surprised if he was the pick at #4, but he’d be worth it in my estimation (at least as far as any of these guys can be “worth it”).  Another guy that hasn’t been strongly linked to the Eagles, but would go a long way towards shoring up the secondary (the biggest NEED of the team).

Chance Warmack – Don’t sleep on Warmack, though he won’t be the pick at #4.  If the team drops to #9, then Warmack is a clear possibility (if he’s there).  The “best” prospect in the draft by consensus rating, Warmack would make a lot of sense for the Eagles.  By now, I’m guessing Kelly realizes the strength of his offense is it’s RBs.  Adding a potentially dominant run-blocker like Warmack might be more of an offensive weapon then we typically think of when it comes to interior linemen.  The read-option requires being able to sell several looks every play, and being able to run it up the guy behind Chance would be a valuable tool.  Additionally, Bryce Brown’s power behind Chance should make short-yardage gains relatively easy.

Tavon Austin – I don’t think he’ll be the pick, but he has to be mentioned since he’s the top offensive “playmaker” available.  The quick comparison is Percy Harvin, but it should be noted that he’s actually a bit smaller than Harvin.  I’m sure Kelly could dream up some creative ways to use him, but I see Austin’s value to the Eagles as mainly trade bait, rather than a target.

I’ll be surprised if the Eagles don’t come out of the draft with one of the players mentioned above.

Some other names to keep in mind towards the end of the 1st round:

Tank Carradine, DE

Jonathan Cyprien, S

Jamar Taylor, CB

Menelik Watson, OT

Xavier Rhodes, CB

I wouldn’t be surprised if the Eagles came up from #35 to grab any of these guys, though as I said before, the S/CBs make the most sense to me.

Lastly, I do not think the Eagles will come away tonight with a QB.

Very short one today, just getting a few things out of the way.

First, here is a very good article from Bill Barnwell on Grantland about the NFL draft.  If you enjoy the work I’ve done here then Barnwell’s piece will make a lot of sense to you.

Second, I added a graph for the TE position:

Few true high-end talents here, and I don’t expect the Eagles to take one with their first two picks.  Travis Kelce has been mentioned a lot as a potential 3rd rounder for the Birds and I think that looks to be about right.  Given Kelly’s purported love of TEs though, this is definitely a potential source for a draft-day(s) surprise (something like Ertz or Escobar in the 2nd).

Lastly, I’ve reordered the top 20 prospect chart I presented on Friday.  Now it matches the format of the positional groups, so that prospect are sorted by “high” value rather than average rating.  Here is the updated chart:

Notice the scale on the left.  All of these prospects are graded very similarly.  Taking “risk” into account, it appears as though the “top tier” is 9 guys deep, ending with Mingo and before Ogletree.  With this in mind, the Cardinals at #7 and the Jets at #9 are the best potential trade down partners for the Eagles.  The team can pick up an extra pick (potentially a high 2nd rounder) and still select a “top tier” prospect, though Mingo is actually the only guy in that group I really DON’T want.

That’s all.  I told you it’d be short (and this time I meant it).

Less than a week until the draft begins, and it’s clear that nobody has any clue what’s going to happen at the top of the board (aside from Joeckel, who seems like a decent bet to go #1).  Although it’s fun reading supposed “intelligence”, most of its useless and will bear no resemblance to what the reality will be, so don’t get too worked up over things like “sources say the Eagles really like Geno Smith”.

Also, the full NFL schedule was released yesterday.  Go have a look if you’re interested. Personally, I don’t think it’s worth that much attention at this stage of the off-season, though playing the Redskins week 1 is nice (likely before RG3 is up to speed).

So what to talk about?

Well over the past few weeks I’ve advanced a number of different ways to view/think about the NFL draft.  Today I think I’ve got the clearest illustration yet of what I believe is the “best” way to look at a draft board.

The general idea is that assigning prospects exact values on a 0-100 scale (or any other scale) is ridiculous.  It’s foolish to think that any scout or group of scouts can accurately grade NFL prospects with such precision.  Conversely, the other method of ranking prospects seems to be a non-numerical hierarchy.  That too is useless.  It’s not enough to know that Player A is ranked above Player B.

We need to know how big of a gap there is!  Otherwise, we have no concept of true value as we go through the draft.

So what can we do better?

We can, rather than assigning specific values, look at VALUE RANGES.  Below, I’ve included a few charts that depict the top 20 prospects and assigns each a range of expected values.  To come up with the ranges, I simply took the average ratings of NFP, ESPN, and NFL.com (our Consensus Ratings from the TPR system) then used the standard deviation for each prospect to create the range (+- 1 SD).

A few notes:  I wish we had a lot more data (ratings).  This does not make any adjustment for positional value, it is strictly a depiction of each prospects individual ratings.  In practice, each team would incorporate their own rankings and adjust for things like positional value, player personality, fit, etc…

Now let’s look at the charts:

Above are the top 11 prospects (by average rating).  As we can clearly see, according to our data, some of these players carry much wider potential ranges than others.  There is no “correct” way to read this graph, it all depends on your personal preference.

For example, if we are just looking for “impact” than we would focus on the HIGH end of the ranges.  Doing this, we can see that Sharrif Floyd may turn out to be the best player in the draft outside of Luke Joeckel, despite the fact that he’s ranked just 7th overall.

Or, if we are risk averse, we can see exactly why Chance Warmack is such an interesting prospect.  Despite playing a positional of relatively little importance, he’s clearly the “least risky” prospect, whose “downside” appears to still be extremely good.

Regardless of what your preference or risk tolerance is, it’s should be pretty clear that a discrete ranking or prospects (i.e. a “big board”) is of little practical value.  It’s vital to get a sense of both the potential downside and upside of each prospect, and to EXAMINE THE OVERLAPS.

Dion Jordan and Eric Fisher carry almost identical consensus ratings, but Fisher has a wider range of potential values.  Is Fisher’s downside trade-off worth his upside potential?  Or would you rather take Jordan, who carries a narrower range of values (but necessarily gives up some upside)?

Here are prospects 12-20:

By average rating, Cordarrelle Patterson is rated higher than Tyler Eifert, but it’s pretty clear you can make the case for Eifert being the better prospect.

Finally, here is a chart of all 20 prospects shown together.  I split them up above to make it easier to see.

If I can convince you of just one thing going into the draft, it’s this.  False precision is incredibly detrimental to value in the NFL draft.  Let’s say you are agnostic as far as positional need, would you rather take Dion Jordan at #4 or slide down and take Star Lotulelei a bit later (assuming you own board looks like the one above).  The “value” in that situation is pretty clearly on the side of moving down.

Putting a hierarchical ranking together and just selecting the best available is a very poor way to derive value in the draft.

While it seems like many people are coming around to the idea that the Eagles should trade down, I figured I’d provide an exercise that illustrates why trading down (but not too far!) is the best option.

First, remember that I previously posted the historical success rates for picks 1-5, 6-10, and 11-15, finding very little difference in the odds (though there are definitely positional differences).  That itself is pretty good evidence for trading down if there is not a single high-quality prospect at a position of great need.

Now let’s play a probability game that will get us to the same place, albeit with a different route.

Suppose I placed three $1 bills and one $20 bill in a hat and asked you and three of your friends to take turns picking one bill (blindly).  The goal, of course, is to select the $20 bill.  Would you want to choose 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th?

The answer might be obvious for those of you familiar with probabilities, but I’m going to run through the math anyway:

1st Choice: 1 out of 4 chance; 25%

2nd Choice: 75% chance the $20 is still there, 1 of 3 chance you select it (75/3) or 25%

3rd Choice: 50% chance the $20 is still there, 1 of 2 chance you select it (50/2) or 25%

4th Choice: 25% chance the $20 is still there, if it is you get it, so 25%

So which turn would you want?  It doesn’t matter!  Your odds of getting the $20 are the same, regardless of whether you choose 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th.

However, I’m betting there’s almost nobody that (prior to reading) chose to pick 4th.

Why is that?

I don’t know, and it could be the result of a number of factors. Perhaps you all actually did choose to pick 4th and I’m way off base, but I really doubt that.  Maybe there is some “participation premium” by which having the opportunity to actually “pick” a bill is assigned a slightly higher value than just receiving whatever is left over.  Maybe we can get really existential and say that there’s something inside all of us that prefers to have some “control” (i.e. getting a choice of bills), even when it’s not real.

Regardless, the odds remain the same, and the reasoning doesn’t matter to us.

Applying it to the Draft

Obviously, the above game is not a perfect representation of the NFL draft.  There are multiple “$20s” in every draft, as well as a much wider selection of values in general.  Also, teams are not picking blind, they know which prospect they are selecting (which would ruin the game above).

However, in particular cases (this draft being one), I think the $20 game is a useful metaphor.  In the game, we know the values but are choosing blindly.  In the draft, we know who we are choosing but don’t know the true values.  While on the surface it’s a bit different, in reality the outcomes remain similar.

So at pick #4, let’s say the Eagles are choosing between Eric Fisher, Dee Milliner, Star Lotulelei, and Dion Jordan.

Which one is the “elite” player?  Is there more than one?  Are there none?  I’m sure everyone has an opinion, but how sure are you?  They’ve all received very similar scouting grades and ratings (when looking at a multiple sources).

Note: I’m ignoring positional differences here because all four of those players would fill a need for the Eagles.

I would argue that, while they are all likely to be good players, I have NO IDEA who will be the “best”.  I could take a guess and write a very compelling essay for why “my guy” is so clearly better than everyone else.  Or I can just admit that projecting player success is an INCREDIBLY hard thing to do and impossible to do perfectly.  In fact, the professional scouts have already tried to do that, and came up with VERY SIMILAR SCORES.

This is a similar point to the one I made in “The Bad GM Theory” post, and one I’ve likely made several times before that.  Let other teams pay a premium for “false control”.  In a draft with so many prospects grouped so closely together, let’s just admit that we don’t know, with any certainty, which is best.

Look back at the $20 game and pretend you have the first pick.  Do you take that pick? or do you trade it to the guy picking 4th, who is willing to give you $2 as payment for switching?

Trade down a few picks, take whatever compensation is available, and let someone else “choose first”.  Our odds of success will be the same, and we’ll pick up and extra pick or two in the process.

Please note that this only holds because we are looking at a tightly packed group of prospects.  Also, you might be saying, this is no different from the normal case for trading down, one that has been made many times before.

Let me finish by clearing that up.  The normal case for trading down is that “we want more picks” and “we’ll still get a good player”.  What I’m saying here is that our odds of getting the BEST PLAYER are no different at #4 than at #7 or #8.  So we can pick up those extra picks and NOT LOSE ANYTHING.

This year, at least, trading down does indeed offer a “free lunch”, and why would you ever turn that down?

UPDATE: The original post did not include the NFL.com big board.  I’ve added a graphic at the bottom that does.

Short post today, since the graphic took a while to put together.

It looks like all of the major outlet “Big Boards” have been finalized.  So now its time to compare them.  Below, I’ve created a graphic that shows the top 25 players on the board for 5 different sources: Kiper, Burke (SI.com), McShay, National Football Post, and my own TPR rankings.  The players are all color-coded in an effort to make it easier to see where they rank on each board.  I’ve also included some lines to help follow the top players.

My goal here was to provide a single source for comparison, since I’ve found it difficult to remember where each writer ranked players.

Notes:

NFP provides the most varied rankings, which is a big advantage for us (since it helps balance the TPR system).  However, just because they’re different doesn’t mean they’re any better or worse.

Most people know by now that Ryan Nassib tops the entire board at NFP, but those rankings also differ significantly for Joeckel, Floyd, and Lane Johnson.  While Joeckel is ranked #1 in every other board here, he comes in just 11th at NFP.

– We see an interesting split regarding Jonathan Cooper.  Kiper, McShay, and Burke all have him ranked either 9th or 10th.  Meanwhile, both NFP and the TPR rankings drop him to 21-22.

– Tyler Eifert ranks in the top 15 in Kiper, McShay, and NFP’s board, but doesn’t even crack the top 25 in the other two.

– Eagles fans should keep an eye on Menelik Watson and Jamar Taylor.  Both make the top 25 of the TPR rankings, but aren’t included on any other board here.  That means they may be underrated (other guys aren’t accounting for low-risk, high-reward) and available close to the #35 pick (Eagles second rounder).  They also both play positions of need for the Eagles (OT and CB).

– For someone with VERY limited football experience, Ziggy Ansah’s evaluations are remarkably consistent.  This should be surprising since he’s widely regarded as the “rawest” prospect, meaning his evaluation requires the most projection and growth assumption.  I’d expect that to result in widely divergent opinions (as some should expect him to NOT reach his “potential”), but we don’t see that here.

With NFL.com:

Today will be a bit high level/abstract, but I think it’s particularly important (given the Eagles draft standing) to talk about one of my favorite current theories regarding successful sports franchise management, namely: The Bad GM Theory (name needs some work).

First, we need to understand what makes a good/bad GM.  In general, it (like all multi-party actions in life) comes down to INFORMATION ASYMMETRY.  I may have discussed this before, so I apologize if I’m repeating myself.  In the NFL, every team is working within the same guidelines.  Everyone follows the same rules (unless you’re the Patriots) and is thus on a “level playing field”.  So how do teams get an advantage?  Two ways:

1) Develop better intelligence (i.e. get better information than everyone else).

2) Interpret public information better than everyone else.

The first option is what scouting is all about.  Teams hire staffs of professionals to go out and evaluate players.  A better scouting staff = better information = a big advantage.

The second part is talked about less often, but is arguably more important.  There is so much public information on every player, that the “better intelligence” angle is extremely difficult to pull off consistently.  Everyone has similar access to players.  Everyone watches the same tape.  I don’t think it’s a stretch to say that, for the most part, NFL teams are working with very similar information regarding individual player evaluation.  The key then is interpretation; what does that information mean?

The Eagles (and every other team) should repeatedly ask themselves one very important question: “What do I know that the other side doesn’t?”  In any particular deal/scenario, the team with the better information is likely to come out on top.  Hence the importance of recognizing Information Asymmetry.

There are two ways to view this, though.  The first and most obvious is to say: I need to be the best at interpreting and gathering intelligence, ensuring I have the advantage in every transaction.

Sounds simple enough, but it’s hard to be very good and only one team can actually be “the best”.

The other way to handle it is to look for teams with WORSE information.  This, as you can probably tell, is where I think teams should focus more energy.  Rather than try to be the absolute best, it seems far easier to me to just identify a subset of teams who are definitively WORSE at both gathering and interpreting information.

Once you’ve identified those teams, every decision should be made with an eye towards taking advantage of those organizations.

Think of it like poker.  If two professionals sit down at a random table in AC, are they likely to play “against” each other?  Or will they, for the most part, stay out of each other’s way and instead focus on the other 6 (or however many) people at the table?  You know, the people who are DEFINITELY worse than them at poker?

So how do you put this into practice?

Step one is accepting the assumption that you are an “average” GM.  It doesn’t matter if you are actually really good (in fact, by just accepting this first part I’d venture to guess you’ve made yourself above-average).  Step two is identifying GMs that are DEFINITELY worse than you are at talent evaluation.

Then it’s just a matter of engaging them.  For instance, you could call up one of these GMs and try to trade with them.

The key here is that rather than relying on something difficult/unlikely (you having the best information), you are relying on something far more reasonable (a bad GM making a bad decision).  You don’t have to be “good”, you just need the other guy to be as “bad” as he usually is.

What does this have to do with the Eagles/Draft?

First, it means that there is a decent chance the Eagles have no interest in one or more of the players drafted in the top 3.  It’s possible that, for the Eagles, the Jaguars and Raiders are both standing there like bodyguards, ready to “take a bullet” for the Eagles by making a poor draft choice.  Especially in a draft like this, with no clear-cut top prospects.

For example, let’s say the Eagles really want Ziggy Ansah.  The Jaguars take him.  By shear virtue of the Jaguars taking him, his quality as a prospect falls, in my estimation.

Also, let’s say a team like the Cardinals wants to trade up for the Eagles pick.  Do it, regardless of compensation.  After all, what’s more likely:

A) A team with a history of poor player evaluations/roster decisions making a bad trade (i.e. being the “loser”)

or

B) A team with a history of poor player evaluations/roster decisions being able to correctly discern which prospect (from a tightly packed bunch) is going to be both the best player of the bunch and good enough to outweigh the additional draft picks given up as compensation for moving up a few spots?

I thought so.  Now as I said at the top, this is very high-level and relatively abstract.  Front offices change, so you can’t just count on a bad franchise continuing to be bad.  Also, a bad GM can get lucky just like a good GM can get unlucky.  Above all else, this whole idea assumes that Roseman is not one of the aforementioned “bad GMs”.

Regardless, which of these headlines would you rather see during the draft:

– The Eagles made a HUGE draft-day trade with the Baltimore Ravens.

or

– The Eagles made a HUGE draft-day trade with the Detroit Lions.

Pretty obvious, no?  All I’m doing is extrapolating from that initial reaction.  To distill this entire post into one sentence, let me paraphrase Sun Tzu:

When your opponent is making a mistake, get the hell out of his way.

Or to make it more applicable, when going against a mistake-prone opponent, maximize the amount of opportunities he has to make a mistake.

Most transactions in the NFL are zero-sum games.  I’d rather bank on “losers” losing than on trying to out-think “winners”.

Come draft day, if I was Howie, I’d have the 5 worst franchises on the phone almost constantly, trying to act as their conduit for getting whomever they want.  Move up, move down, whatever; if the other team loses the trade, there’s a good chance I won.