Total Prospect Rankings (PVM Version 2.0), Balancing Risk and Reward in the NFL Draft

As promised, I have completed a relatively dramatic overhaul of the PVM system.  Just as I did in the original post, I’ll explain the methodology and theory first (and changes) and then list the updated rankings.  Feel free to skip to the bottom if you don’t care how the system works.

Please note that this is still far from a finished product.  There are a number of issues (mostly calibration) that I will only be able to address after collecting several years of data.  Additionally, I’m posting it now so that I can incorporate and comments/criticism prior to the draft.

The Theory

The original PVM system was meant to function as a better determination of BPA (Best Player Available) rankings.  In essence, a player’s scouting grade is not enough.  A complete system will account for positional value and positional risk IN ADDITION to the scouting grade.

Basically, this system is an attempt to provide a “Default BPA Ranking”, against which all team drafts can be compared/graded.  The original system included two components, scouting grades and a positional value multiplier (hence the PVM name).  Today, we’ll add a measure of risk to the formula.

Methodology 

As mentioned above, the system is composed of three components:

Consensus Scouting Grade – Player/Positional Risk Adjustment + Positional Impact Bonus

Consensus Scouting Grade

This is the easiest part.  I compiled prospect ratings from 3 4 reputable sources: Scouts Inc. (ESPN), NFL.com, the National Football Post, and Draft Ace.  The NFP’s scale is different, so those number were adjusted for an apples-to-apples comparison.  Additionally, NFP includes letter grades/modifiers that were not incorporated here.  Each source is weighted equally, with the average score taken as the “Consensus Rating”.

Player/Positional Risk Adjustment

This is the new addition to the system.  Obviously, some players/positions carry more risk than others.  I’ve attempted to quantify that using two measures: standard deviation of the scouting ratings and historical positional miss rates.

Positional Miss Rates:  To quantify the positional risk, I looked at every player drafted in the 1st or 2nd Round between 1999 and 2011.  Basically, players selected in the 1st and 2nd round are expected to be starters, regardless of position.  The miss rate is an attempt to see which positions have larger margins of evaluative error.  Here are the rates I arrived at:

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A player counts as a “miss” if they did not start for at least 5 seasons (according to Pro-Football-Reference.com) or, if they have not been in the league that long, have not started at least half the time. Note that my historical data does not break out LBs by outside/inside, hence the same miss rate.

As you can see, there is a very wide disparity in success rates.  As expected, offensive linemen are “safer” picks, while offensive skill positions are the riskiest.

Here’s where calibration comes into play.  The scouting grades are out of 100 points.  To arrive at a positional risk measure, I multiplied the historic miss rates by 100, then took the square root of that.  For example, the risk adjustment for the TE position would be 100 * .28 = 28.  SQRT(28) = 5.27.

That’s the first half of the risk measure.

I then took each player’s rating standard deviation and multiplied it by .5.  Basically, the idea here is that wide agreement among scouts should equate to more certainty and vise-versa.  Therefore,  a high standard deviation means we are less certain about the consensus rating.  A low standard deviation means we are more certain.  I took half of the SD measure to avoid overly penalizing players with high consensus grades but high standard deviations.  On the pure SD measure, players with lower grades across the board can jump players with higher grades across the board, by shear virtue of small deviation.

I then added this to the positional measure explained above to arrive at the Risk Adjustment.  The Risk Adjustment is subtracted from the consensus prospect rating.

For Example: Sharrif Floyd’s consensus rating is 92.98.  His standard deviation multiplied by .5 = 1.66.  His positional risk measure (DT) equals 6.76.

6.76 + 1.66 = 8.42

So Floyd’s Risk Adjustment is 8.42, his score after accounting for risk is 84.56.

Now we need to add our last component, positional value.

Positional Value Multiplier

The overall idea here remains the same as the original system.  However, I’ve changed both the sources of data and the subset included.

Previously, we used the average cap hit for each position across the entire league.  Since the NFL has a salary cap, the relative allocations should tell us how teams, in general, value different positions.

However, those measures included rookie contracts and contracts for players not expected to contribute at their position (like a special teams ace).

So here’s what I did instead:

First I went to Pro Football Focus and counted how many players played more than 50% of their team’s snaps at each position.  I did this to account for positional scarcity (e.g. there are a lot more WRs than Cs).  I then took 25% of those measures so that we will only be looking at players considered well above average at their position (at least by pay).

Then I looked up the top _ contracts at each position and found the average value at each position.

I used those averages to create new positional multiplier values.  Here are the new measures:

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Compared to the original measures, there is a wider disparity.  For instance, the QB measure was previously 9.07%, significantly less than the new measure.

Just as we did before, I used these measures to inflate the Risk Adjusted Prospect score for each player.

To recap: We start with the Consensus Ratings, Subtract a Risk Measure to account for player rating uncertainty and positional scouting error, then inflate according to the PVM numbers to account for positional impact.

Overall, the biggest flaw right now is the calibration of the Risk Measure and PVMs, their subjective.  However, I attempted to balance the relative magnitude of both of them.  Additionally, if we step back and look at the overall measure, we see that relative importance is as follows:

– Consensus ratings (by far the most important)

– Positional Value and Risk

– Individual player rating uncertainty

That looks right to me, as far as what I’m going for.  As I mentioned above, the only way to arrive at a “correct” calibration is to use the system for several years, then analyze the rankings to see which parts of the formula are over-weighted and which are under-weighted.

By all means, if you have thoughts as to how to improve the system, let me know.  We still have a couple of weeks to make revisions/improvements.

Total Prospect Rankings

Here they are, we’ll talk about them in more detail starting tomorrow.Screen Shot 2013-04-09 at 6.35.52 PM

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Random Thoughts

Since it’s Friday, I’ll use today’s post as a kind of clearinghouse for thoughts on several areas.  FYI, I probably won’t have time to post on Monday, so I apologize in advance for not providing the requisite time-kill.

Free Agent Tackles

– I would be very surprised if the Eagles aren’t interested in both Winston and Clabo.  I don’t think the team is completely enamored by either, but given the current OL, it’d be foolish not to consider bringing either of those guys in at the right price.  I think Winston is holding out for a deal the Eagles are unlikely to provide.  Clabo is more interesting.  Given his age, I doubt he’ll find any long-term offers.  At a reasonable price for 1-2 years, he’d address a need for the Eagles.

Again though, if the Eagles are sold on Fisher in the draft, there’s no way they sign a starting RT.

Draft

Everyone is trying to game out what Chip Kelly is thinking.  I think everyone is forgetting about Howie a bit too easily.

We already know Howie has the final say on draft matters.  Obviously Kelly has a huge amount of input, but Howie very recently experienced what happens when a GM bows too easily to a coach’s wishes (Jarrett definitely, maybe Watkins as well).  I doubt he’ll let that happen again so soon, especially with a coach who’s never done this before.

Therefore, “what is Howie thinking?” should be a question more people are asking.

If I had to guess, may answer would be “please god let me trade down”.  I know that it’s popular to say how little interest there is in trading up in this draft, but I find that to be a bit overblown.  There are a number of prospects that I can easily see individual teams falling in love with (Eric Fisher, Sharrif Floyd, Dion Jordan, Ziggy Ansah, Star Lotulelei, Geno Smith).  Additionally, there is such uncertainty that no team has a good handle on when any of those guys will be available.

In that scenario, all it takes is one team with an itchy trigger finger.  It’s very conceivable that the Eagles could choose any of the prospects I mentioned above.  That should be enough to scare a team into action if they really like one of those guys.

That may just be wishful thinking, but I think it’s a scenario that is being dismissed too hastily.

Individual Prospects

I’m starting to get a feeling that perhaps we’re all overlooking the obvious.

– Our defense needs a lot of improvement (far more than the offense).

– The DL has a particularly glaring hole in it.

– Chip has repeatedly professed a love for big, freakishly athletic players.

and yet…I have yet to see Ziggy Ansah mocked to the Eagles.

Ansah is 6’5″, 270 lbs with long arms and big hands.  Explosive athleticism and great quickness.  He’s “old” at 24 yrs, and first played football in 2010 if I’m reading correctly.  So here we have a top DL prospect with freakish athleticism who sounds like he could step into the 5-tech spot, a position of great need for the Eagles.

I don’t think it’s likely, but it makes too much sense to me to not consider it a real possibilty.

Sharrif Floyd –

This is almost the opposite of Ansah.  I’m seeing Floyd mocked to the Eagles and I still don’t understand it.  He looks to be a 3-tech guy; we already have Cox, end of story.  He might be able to play 5-tech, but certainly doesn’t look to be a NT, severely limiting his value for the Eagles.

Star Lotulelei –

I’m just going to keep on repeating this (I’ve been saying it for a LONG time), Lotulelei is an EXCELLENT fit for the Eagles.  Now that his heart issue is resolved, there are no more red flags.  He can play 5-tech, he can play NT.  His first-step quickness makes him a nightmare for centers when he’s lined up at 0.  Yes, please.

Eric Fisher –

Fisher, obviously, is a likely possibility for the Eagles.  Top OT (after Joeckel) and the Eagles need one.  However, keep in mind that OTs are also among the easiest to find later in the draft.  Especially if Kelly is OK with Herremans at OT this year, waiting until the 2nd or 3rd round to take one makes a lot of sense.

Dion Jordan –

Popular pick due to his size/athleticism and the Oregon ties.  This may be a tricky one for the Eagles though.  Kelly might know him TOO well.  I imagine a coach like Kelly will inevitably think VERY highly of players who played a large role in his earlier success.

However, Kelly is a very smart guy, so hopefully he knows that his opinion is inherently biased, potentially to a large degree.  This is where Howie really needs to step up.  If he doesn’t think Jordan is the best guy on the board, the Eagles can’t take him, regardless of what Chip thinks.  This goes back to the point I made above:  This is Howie’s draft, not Chip’s.

That’s all for today.  Enjoy your weekend.  I’m making some heavy revisions/updates to the PVM system and hope to have it available some time next week (that way we have time to pull it apart for a little while before the draft).

Necessary Conditions for Winning a Super Bowl

Since we’re in the midst of the off-season, between the two major team-construction events, I thought it’d be a good time to explain my personal philosophy on what it takes to win a Super Bowl.  The goal is to try to dig down to the most basic attributes a team must have, and in the process examine clichés like “defense wins championships” or “you need an elite QB”.

Here’s where I am currently:

To win the Super Bowl:

– You need a lot of good players.

– You need some of those players to play great (greatly?) in the playoffs.

– You need to get a few lucky bounces along the way.

That’s my current theory at least, I’ll update it as I find new data that conflicts.  Today I’ll give my thoughts on the QB position and then examine the whole Offense vs. Defense wins championships thing.

Overall, I’d like to identify a set of necessary conditions for winning the Super Bowl.  Today is the first step in that endeavor.

First I’ll attack the QB position:

You do not need an elite QB to win the Super Bowl.  It certainly helps, but the fact is you just need a “good enough” QB.  The entire “elite” debate is ridiculous, but especially at the QB position.  When you use the term “elite”, you’re alluding to a very exclusive group.  Is the top 10% fair?

If so, that means the number of “elite” starting QBs in the NFL is between 3 and 4.  So congratulations Patriots, Packers, and Broncos; one of you obviously won the Super Bowl last year.

The fact is, the term “elite” is useless since there’s no standard definition, and even if there were it wouldn’t mean anything significant.  Teams need a QB that is “good enough”.  So what does my list look like?

Good Enough – Brady, Manning (both), Rodgers, Brees, Ryan, Roethlisberger, Flacco, Schaub, Romo (i hate him but yes), Rivers, Kaepernick, Luck

That’s my list, although I’m sure there is some disagreement.  Also, this is not to say a QB not on that list CAN’T win the SB, just that, at this moment, I don’t believe they’ve proven themselves good enough.

Joe Flacco is not an “elite” QB, by any realistic definition.  However, that doesn’t matter, he still won the Super Bowl.  Colin Kaepernick came damn close.

The problem for Eagles fans is that neither Vick nor Foles looks good enough this year.  It’s possible Foles could get there, but extremely unlikely this season.  I’m pessimistic about Vick’s chances.

Does Defense Win Championships?

Well, what do you think?  Now consider:

– Over the last 10 seasons, 5 SB winning teams ranked in the top 7.5% for points allowed per game.  Put differently, the top 24 out of the last 320 team seasons contained half of the Super Bowl winning teams.

This is, perhaps, the most surprised I have ever been by a stat I’ve looked up while writing.  In any case, it would certainly appear as though having a truly great defense goes a long way.

What about offense?

Based upon the above stat, I would expect to find a similar result (i.e. be great at something, either offense or defense).  Looking at the same sample:

– Just 1 SB winning team (New Orleans ’09) in the last ten years placed in the top 7.5% of points scored, or 92.5 percentile.

If we look at the top 10% of offenses over the last 10 years, just one more SB champ makes the cut, the 2004 Patriots.

Put together, it seems like having a “great” defense is preferable to having a “great” offense.  That definitely has to change the overall theory a bit.

What about the reverse perspective?

– The lowest ranked offense to win the Super Bowl in the last ten years was the 2008 Steelers, who averaged just 21.7 ppg, good enough for exactly 160 out of 320, or the 50th percentile.

The 2003 Patriots are just above them, having averaged 21.8 ppg.  Interesting to note that the Patriots (now offensive juggernauts), won their first title with a fairly weak offense.

As you might have expected, both the ’03 Patriots and the ’08 Steelers had historically great defenses.   Both placed in the top 10 of the last 10 years.

– The lowest ranked Defense to win the SB in the last ten years was the ’11 NY Giants, who allowed 25 ppg (while scoring just 24.6, leaving them the only SB winning team with a negative point differential, I really hate the Giants).

That places them 265th out of 320 teams, or 17th percentile.

– Among SB winners of the past 10 years, the 2007 Giants are the lowest ranked offense that did NOT have a corresponding historically great defense.  They scored 23.3 ppg, ranking the team 120th out of 320, or the 62.5 percentile.

I feel like we need some charts, so here are two, one showing points allowed vs. Wins and the other showing Points Scored vs. Wins.  Note this is just regular season data.

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Both illustrate strong correlations.  The values:

– Points Scored to Wins:  .768

– Points Allowed to Wins: -.669

Have I confused you yet?

If not, good for you, because I’ve certainly confused myself.  Let me attempt to summarize what we’ve seen here today:

– A GREAT defense goes a long way, but is NOT a necessary condition to winning a SB.  Neither is a GOOD defense, as evidenced by the ’11 Giants, ’06 Colts, and ’07 Giants (all placed in the bottom 50% yet still won the SB).

– A GREAT offense does not go as far, but a GOOD offense does seem to be a necessary condition for winning a SB.  No offense ranked in the bottom 62.5% for the last ten years has won the SB.

What does it all mean?

While teams should focus on being good everywhere, it appears as though Offense should take slight preference, as the only way to win without a very good offense is to have a historically GREAT defense, which is obviously harder to put together.

Or you can be like the NY Giants and just ride a wave of lucky bounces…twice.

Visualizing the Offense

Yesterday we did the defense, so naturally today we will do the offense.  However, this is a little bit less informative due to the injuries the team sustained last season.

I’m going to skip the original chart I made because it was based on perceived ability (not performance), and included all of the injured starters.  Using PFF’s grades, this is how the offense looked last season.Screen Shot 2013-04-02 at 11.05.12 AM

A couple of notes, then I’ll highlight a few areas.  Due to the injuries, there were a number of players that received playing time.  I used whichever player took the most snaps as the rule for inclusion.  Watkins and Scott played nearly the same amount, but they ranked similarly so the color wouldn’t change.  There were also a few players who were on the edge as to which color they deserved (for instance Shady was the last spot in the top third).  I could have done the mixed colors again, but I wanted it to be as clear as possible.

Takeaways-

– Both Jeremy Maclin and D-Jax played well below their potential.  Perhaps not surprising given the QB situation and the state of the O-Line, but it remains a cautionary note going into next season.  We know Maclin has the talent, but we can’t pretend he’s a lock to realize that next year.

– Jason Peters will hopefully come back as green.

– I know everyone loves Jason Kelce, but PFF graded him close to the bottom for his rookie year.  I think he’ll be good, but this is another position at which fans seem to be buying the upside without realizing there’s a reasonably significant chance it doesn’t work out.  For the record, his rating in 2011 would have placed Kelce LAST in 2012, below Dallas Reynolds.

– The right side of the line is tough to project.  If the Eagles draft a RT at #4 and shift Herremans back to RG, then both of those spots could go green.  Keep that in mind as we get closer to the draft.

Drafting a starting RT could provide immediate improvement at TWO positions.

– Although I don’t need to mention this, having your QB grade out red is bad.  Of the 27 QBs that played more than 50% of their team’s snaps, just 4 ranked worse than Vick (Ponder, Fitzpatrick, Sanchez, Weeden).

– It will be interesting to see how James Casey and Brent Celek split time.  I know Kelly says he will use a lot of 2 TE sets, and Casey can line up almost anywhere, but it wouldn’t surprise me at all to see Casey supplant Celek as the starting TE.

– Finally, PFF’s ratings shouldn’t be taken as gospel. So feel free to disagree with the colors above, just note that the source is Pro Football Focus, not me.

That’s all for today.  Working on some bigger stuff that takes time, but the results should be fun.

Visualizing the Defense

Now that we’re through free agency, I think it’s time to take another look at the defensive line-up.  Previously, I put together an illustration of the Eagles 2012 starting defensive line-up, with each position color-coded according to performance/ability.

Today, I’ll put the same illustration together, this time with a the scheme/roster additions reflected.  I think doing this visually makes the comparison much easier to see.  Additionally, I’ll go back an update last season’s using PFF’s ratings in an attempt to take some of the subjectivity out of the ratings.

This is an attempt to make roster evaluation as simplistic and easy as possible.  Red = Bad, Green = Good.

Please note that this (the color-coding) is obviously subjective (hence the PFF adjustment in the second chart).  My guess is there are a few players for whom there will be disagreement over the corresponding color rating.

Here is the original graphic of last year’s defense, not updated with PFF:Screen Shot 2013-04-01 at 11.42.56 AM

For reference, Green = above average starter, Yellow = league average starter, Red = Below league average.  If I could go back and change anything, it’d be the CB ratings.  I was far too generous to both Nnamdi and DRC.  Using pure performance (not potential), they both should have been red.  For those paying attention, that means the ENTIRE Eagles secondary would be rated below league average (which sounds about right in hindsight).

Now let’s use PFF’s ratings.  If a player was in the top third of the league (starters), they’ll be green, middle third = yellow, bottom = red.  This chart will be a reflection of ONLY total performance, so no adjustments made for inconsistency (see multi-colored ratings above).

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Note that Nate Allen and Akeem Jordan have replaced Anderson and Chaney.  At the time I did the last one, Anderson and Chaney were the starters.   However, over the whole season Jordan and Allen played more snaps.

Looks like the original ratings were pretty good, except for the previously mentioned CBs.  Additionally, while Kendricks had runs of both very good and bad play, his overall rating was very poor.

As you can see, there was far too much red and not nearly enough green last year.  It comes as no surprise then, that to date, most roster changes have been made on defense.

Now comes the hard part, trying to project next year’s team.  First a couple of rules:  Injury-risk will not be taken into account.  This is obviously a major concern, but I don’t see any good way to incorporate it into the graphic.  Therefore, I’ll projected the “on paper” defense, then highlight the risks afterwards.  Also, since we don’t know the exact defensive alignment Kelly will use, I’ll stick with a basic 3-4.

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Keep in mind that the actual physical alignment will be different from what’s shown above. However, I think right now this is as good a guess as any in terms of personnel.

What jumps out?

– Phillips, Chung, and Fletcher can all be considered “injury risks”.  That’s a big chunk of the secondary (as well as the source of major improvement over last year).  If any or all of those guys go down, the Eagles are back in the red.

– The DL has gone from a strength (relatively speaking) to a weakness.  Cox is a keeper and should anchor the line (I don’t see him having an issue transitioning to the 3-4, regardless of whether he ends up as a 3-tech or 5-tech.)  However, Spooky is just a body and can’t be counted on for even league-average play.  Also, the opposing DE spot is a glaring hole on the roster (hence all the Star/Floyd draft talk).  I think there’s a good chance they address this with one of those prospects.  It’s also possible Vinny Curry puts on some weight and takes a shot at this spot.  In any case, as of this moment, it has to be viewed as a weakness.

– As I mentioned after their signings, the Williams/Fletcher combo is going to take some getting used to (Fletcher may not even win the job).  The hope here is for league-average play, nothing more.

Overall, the D looks a lot different from last year (personnel-wise).  However, it’s clear we still need a couple of impact players (i.e. green).  Maybe Barwin rebounds and becomes one of them.  Maybe Cole or Graham transitions better than projected.  Maybe Kendricks flourishes at his new spot and finds a consistent game.  Hopefully the team can use the draft to upgrade from red to green either at NT or DE.  That’s a lot of unknowns.

Keep in mind that it’s easier to go from bad (red) to average (yellow) than it is to go from average to good (green).  It’s clear that Roseman and Kelly looked at the second chart above (the PFF adjusted one) and tried to address every red mark (weakness).  On paper, they’ve been successful.

Even so, as of this moment, the Defense is still pretty far from one we can safely project as “good”.  Though after last season, I’ll be happy with just average.

Fumbles and Luck

There’s a lot of disagreement about how much of a role luck plays in turnovers, and fumbles in particular.  I’ve addressed this in more detail before (search fumbles for the posts), but today I just want to throw out some quick data to give a better illustration of the overall points I’ve been trying to make.

First, we can mostly agree that fumble recovery % is luck-dependent.  Not all fumbles are created equal, and where they happen can effect which team recovers.  However, I think it’s fair to say that, in general, teams should recover around 50%.

Last year the Eagles recovered 35% (according to Teamrankings).  Buffalo was worst in the league at 30.6%.  Washington led the league at 67.39%.

I previously looked at the persistence of fumble recovery rate and, as expected, found no meaningful correlation.  While that’s not enough to prove recovery rates are entirely luck, it is enough to show that the Eagles are very likely to improve on that measure next year.

Fumble Differential

We’ve talked about TO Differential, but now I’ll look at pure fumble differential (gained-lost).

– The 2012 Eagles’ fumble differential was -17, or 2nd worst in the last 10 years.  Obviously, the NFL average is 0.

– There is no evidence of persistence in fumble differential.  That means, despite how bad the Eagles were with fumbles last year (-17), that has no predictive power for what that measure will be next year.

– Something to remember here is that the differential also includes fumbles forced and recovered.  The Eagles gained just 5 last year.  The NFL average is 11 over the past 10 years.  The lowest over that time was 3, not far off from the Eagles’ 5.

So let’s back away from the luck aspect for the moment (that takes a lot longer to address, particularly regarding “fumble-prone” players).  What I’m basically say is this:

– The Eagles are very likely to fumble less next year.

– The Eagles are very likely to force more fumbles next year.

– The Eagles are also likely to recover a greater % of all fumbles next year.

Regardless of where you stand on luck vs. skill, I’d be surprised if many people disagreed with any of those three statements after looking at the data.

Put those together and the Eagles are very likely to have a significantly improved fumble differential, which obviously means the team is likely to have an improved overall TO differential.

Note: Nothing is guaranteed here, we are just talking about probability.  Just because the team was unlucky last year doesn’t mean it can’t ALSO be unlucky next year.  That’s possible.

The key here is that there appears to be extremely LITTLE room for the team to get worse (because of how bad they were), hence they will likely get better.

There’s also the issue of interceptions, which I haven’t really addressed.

I’ll try to tackle interceptions sometime soon, but I wanted to be very clear about the overall ideas here.  Even if you believe fumbles are not inherently luck-dependent, the Eagles are still very likely to improve next year.

I want to make sure we’re not losing the forest for the trees here.  I’ll tackle the luck vs. skill issue in more detail later and provide further evidence for why I believe fumbles are heavily luck-dependant.

BTW, this post is the result of a very thoughtful email from someone who raised a few issues with my previous post.  As I’ve said before, I make no representations for being perfect, so critiques are both welcome and necessary.  Please email me at  eaglesrewind@gmail.com if you have any issues with posts I put up.  I’d rather have the chance to fix mistakes or explain assertions than have individual monuments to my stupidity preserved for posterity.

Leftover thoughts from yesterday

Relatively short post today, but I wanted to get a few things out there:

– I’ve settled on a methodology for incorporating positional evaluative error (in the draft) into the PVM prospect rankings.  However, it’ll require me to reclassify close to 1000 player’s positions by hand (Pro-Football-Reference includes a lot of “DB” labels).  Obviously that’s going to take a little while.  However, I promise I haven’t forgotten about it.

– A valued contributor (see PVM) commented yesterday about the Eagles having a lot of red zone turnovers last year and how that effected the points allowed.  The idea is that a turnover in the red zone, while killing the offense, is essentially a great punt for the defense.  Unfortunately I couldn’t find any source that tells me how many turnovers were committed in the Red Zone last year.  In any case, here’s a chart of TO Margin vs Points Allowed:

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Lot’s of potential external distortions in this comparison, so we can’t draw much from it, but it is interesting nonetheless (and everyone loves charts).  The correlation value is -.50, so pretty significant.

As you can see, the 2012 Eagles are way outside the normal range.  Going back to the original question:  Yes, it appears as though, given the TO differential, the Eagles should have been expected to yield MANY more points.  It’s possible this is the result of where those turnovers happened (i.e. in the red zone).  However, there are a lot of other factors potentially at work here.

It may be that there’s an actual limit to how many points one team can allow (if for no other reason than a finite game time), so that the marginal increase in points allowed per additional turnover decreases to zero.

I realize that’s a bit theoretical for a football blog, so you’re excused if your eyes glazed over reading it.  Overall, my general take is that the location of turnovers is probably a real, but small, factor in the larger points allowed puzzle.

Let’s do some fun stats:

– The 2012 Eagles forced and recovered just 5 fumbles.  That is the eighth WORST in the last ten years (out of 320).

– The NFL average within the sample is 11.

– Fumbles are determined almost entirely by luck.

– The Eagles threw 15 interceptions last year.  The NFL average over the past 10 years? 15.76.

– The 2011 Eagles threw 25 interceptions, so last year was improvement by 10.

– From 1999-2011, the Detroit Lions made 17 1st round picks.  Of those 17 players, just 3 have made a Pro Bowl, one of which was Roy Williams (WR).  That’s 17.6%.

– Of all 1st rounders picked over that timeframe (412 players), 34% made at least 1 Pro Bowl.

– The Lions have been almost impossibly bad at drafting.

– For reference, the Eagles made 11 1st round picks over that timeframe, with 4 making a Pro Bowl, good for 36.4% (better than league average, though that includes the Lions).  However, the most recent one for the Eagles was drafted back in 2004. (sad face)

– Quick trivia: name those 4 Pro Bowlers. Answer below in initials form (hopefully so a glance won’t ruin the question for you.

 

 

 

 

– Answer: Their initials are LS CS SA DM.

– Eric Winston, to my knowledge, is still a free agent.  Hopefully he and his agent blink soon.

 

Turnovers and the Eagles potential for 2013 Success

NOTE: After today’s post (and recent analyses), I believe it’s time to change the Blog subtitle.  Hard to believe, but I think I’m now the most positive Eagles blogger I know of. Thank god for data and objectivity.

Today let’s go back to the turnover issue.  As most of you know, the Eagles were terrible last year when it came to “taking care of the ball”.  The team had a turnover differential of -24, which is tied for LAST place over the previous 10 seasons.

I repeat, LAST over the previous 10 seasons. (The Chiefs of last year were equally bad).

With that comes the previous analysis I did showing the correlation between TO Differential and Wins.  The value is a very significant .64.  So turnover differential is really important and the Eagles were historically bad last year by that measure, hence a 4 win season.

Now let’s take it one step further and see if we can learn anything about what might happen THIS year.

I did a similar analysis, but this time focused on the CHANGE in both turnovers and WINS from one year to the next.  Given the .64 value above, teams making improvements to TO differential year-over-year should see a corresponding improvement in Wins (or losses is TO differential gets worse.)

Here’s the chart, with Win Change on the X and TO Differential change on the Y:Screen Shot 2013-03-27 at 12.29.03 PM

The correlation value is .63, about what we would expect given the first order Wins/TO Differential correlation value.

The chart is a little tough to read, so let me make it simple with an example:  Let’s say your team’s TO Differential FELL by 10 this coming season.  To find the corresponding win change, find -10 along the Y axis and then move left or right until you hit the line.  Here, a decline in TO differential of 10 equates to an approximate 4 win decline.  HOWEVER, notice the spread is relatively large; this means we need to recognize that our level of precision (confidence) here isn’t very big.

So what does this mean?

Well let’s go back to the 2012 Eagles.  The team’s TO Differential was -24.  As I’ve discussed before, this was heavily influenced by incredibly bad luck with fumbles (in both their existence and the team’s recovery rate.)  I expect both measures to improve dramatically next season,  purely because last year’s were so unlikely.

Let’s say the Eagles move from the 99% in TO differential (negative perspective) to just the 90% (Using the last 320 team seasons/10 league years as data).  That equates to a TO differential of -13.  That’s still really bad (hence the 90%), so we’re not really doing the Eagles any favors here.

However, because last year’s measure was so bad, moving to -13 is still an IMPROVEMENT of 11 turnovers.

Here’s where it gets fun.  Going back to our chart, an improvement of 11 in TO differential equates to an approximate gain of 5 wins.

Presto chango, 4-12 last year just became 9-7 next year.  

Unfortunately, there’s that pesky little precision problem, which means a 5 win gain is far from certain.  However, the overall point remains: by just being BAD instead of HORRIBLE when it comes to TOs, the Eagles can achieve a much better record.

It must be noted though, that the Eagles achieving 4 wins last year with a -24 TO differential is a minor miracle in itself.  The team’s “overperformance” last year means there’s probably a little less room for adding wins due purely to positive mean regression next year.

Now let’s get really crazy (prepare your happy face):

Over the last 9 seasons (not including this past year since we don’t have subsequent season data), 17 teams registered a TO Differential of -15 or worse.

The average change in TO differential the following season?

+18.4

Conclusion:

a) The Eagles are likely to improve their TO performance substantially next year.

b) Positive improvements in TO differential are STRONGLY correlated with positive Win changes.

A + B = The Eagles have a significant chance (nothing is certain) to be A LOT better than you think next year.

Special Teams Importance and Improvement

Surprise news from the Eagles yesterday: the team signed a punter (Jones) and cut McBriar.  For most casual fans, this move probably doesn’t register as anything other than replacing one guy most people don’t know with another.

However, it has the potential to make a big impact, and put in context with the other moves the team has made, shows a clear recognition of one of the team’s biggest weaknesses last year:  special teams.

Though it flies beneath the radar of most casual fans, special teams is indeed important, and the Eagles were terrible in this area last season.

Let’s look at some stats:

– The Eagles ranked 28th in the league in Net Yards per Successful Punt last year with 37.3.

– The 49ers and Saints were tied for 1st overall with 43.2, meaning these teams, on average, gained SIX more yards per punt than the Eagles did.  While most of the league didn’t perform nearly as well, this is an indication of just how big a role the punting game can play (6 yards per punt difference is HUGE in case anyone didn’t realize that).

– According to Football Outsiders, the Eagles ranked 24th in the league last year in overall special teams.  Only 2 teams ranked in the bottom third of the league made the playoffs (Redskins and Texans).

– According to Football Outsiders, the Eagles ranked LAST in the league in punting last year.

– The Eagles were also UNLUCKY, with the fourth largest special teams disadvantage due to factors outside the team’s control (opposing field goals, kickoff distance, punt distance).

So what?

Looking at the above stats gives us an appreciation for how weak the ST unit was last year.  That last stat is interesting because it fits what I’ve been saying/showing for a long time:

The 2012 Eagles were a mediocre team with VERY bad luck.

While the offense and defense are more important, it’s nice to see Roseman and Kelly taking improvements everywhere they can find them.  There is no guarantee that Donnie Jones will be any better than McBriar was or that the coverage will be any better either.  However, it’s likely that both areas will improve, due to the low bar set by last year’s team.

The upshot is field position.  I’ve covered this before, but the Eagles ranked last, by a long shot, in relative field position last year (-6.67 yards).  Improvements to special teams will help this measure.  Consequently, the offense will have fewer yards to travel to get in scoring range and the defense will have more yards behind them.

Field position is an aspect of the game that is tough to focus on in real-time.  6.67 yards does not sound like much, but remember that is an AVERAGE PER DRIVE.  Last year, every Eagles offensive drive started, on average, almost 7 yards farther from the end zone then the opponent’s corresponding drive.

While everyone is focusing on the defensive scheme and roster changes while getting excited about the offense, arguably the easiest area for improvement is special teams.

The signings of Jones, Benn, Chung, Phillips, etc… will go a long way in that area.  I don’t expect fans to get excited over things like kick coverage and net punting average, but improvements here will show up in the box score by making it easier for the Eagles to score and harder for opponents to do the same.