Patrick Causey, on Twitter @pcausey3

There was a moment last night where I just stopped and shook my head. It had nothing to do with what was happening on the field, but was instead a reaction to the fact that I was studying film of Carson Wentz in a preseason game against third string competition. But given that this was likely one of the only extended looks we will see from Wentz in the next year (unless this season goes horribly wrong), here I am.

Overall, I thought Wentz’s play was in line with my scouting report that I did pre-draft: some positives, some negatives, and some hope for the future. Let’s break down the big take aways from his Eagles debut.

1. Wentz looks like he belongs.

Yes, it was only a preseason game. Yes, Wentz was playing against second and third string competition. Yes, “insert any other caveat you want to apply.” But Wentz did not look overwhelmed by the moment or by the increase in speed from the FCS:

https://twitter.com/pcausey3/status/763908957018677248

There is a laundry list of quarterbacks that look less poised than Wentz but have significantly more experience: Geno Smith, Matt Leinart, Brady Quinn. While that is an admittedly low bar, it is nonetheless encouraging that Wentz looks like he belonged out there.

Two plays immediately come to mind. In the third quarter, the Bucs showed pressure off the edge with a corner blitz. Wentz quickly diagnosed where the pressure was coming from and hit the hot option in stride:

This looks simple, but many quarterbacks struggle with this, especially rookies, who can be overwhelmed by the moment, the added responsibilities, the more complex defenses, and the increased speed of the game. Wentz was not phased in the least.

The other play that exemplified Wentz’s poise came in the third quarter when Wentz was under enormous pressure almost immediately:

It looks like a botched snap count, as at least three lineman were slow to get off their blocks. Special shout-out to rookie offensive tackle Halapoulivaati Vaitai, who must have fallen asleep on this play:

But, back to Wentz. There are veteran quarterbacks in this league that wouldn’t have handled this immediate pressure as well as Wentz. He wasn’t phased, didn’t get the deer in the headlights look; he kept his cool, used his legs to break containment, kept his eyes down field and delivered a strike for a nice gain.

2. Wentz is incredibly athletic and is especially adept at throwing on the move

When Mike Mayock compared Wentz’s athleticism to Andrew Luck leading up to the draft,  people laughed. But Wentz is proving Mayock right.

Wentz is 6’5, 237 lbs, but moves like a gazelle. He routinely evaded pressure (as the clip above illustrates), minimizing the harm caused by a leaky offensive line.

That video cuts off right before Wentz slid to avoid the hit. According to Les Bowen, Wentz said after the game that was the first time he slid in his life, a welcomed development.

Later in the game, Wentz showed less restraint (while also flashing impressive mobility to beat the blitzer to the edge). The kid simply cannot afford to take these kind of hits on even a semi-regular basis:

Prior to the draft, I noted that Wentz excelled while throwing on the move. This is a unique trait for a young quarterback, as most quarterbacks’ mechanics fall to the wayside, impacting their accuracy. Wentz’s ability to throw on the move was on full display last night:

Wentz is especially impressive when he is stepping up into the pocket. I think part of this is that it forces better mechanics out of Wentz, preventing him from “arming” the ball, a problem I saw a lot in his college tape. Check out this play from his first series of the game, where he delivers an impressive strike to Ertz while stepping up into the pocket

3. Wentz needs to improve his accuracy

It wasn’t all pretty though. Wentz completed only 50% of his passes, thanks in large part to some ill-placed throws.

When Wentz misses,  he often misses high, sailing the ball beyond the reach of his receiver (and, at least to this point, the defenders as well). I counted at least three passes that were not catchable last night:

You can see another example here.

Wentz also needs to improve his precision, as his ball placement was inconsistent at times last night. Here’s one example:

Fourth year wide receiver (#16) T.J. Graham is running a seven-yard curl towards the inside of the field. He has a good 5 yard buffer on his defender, so it should be an easy pitch and catch. But Wentz puts the ball high and to the outside shoulder. Graham arguably could have caught this — and indeed, if it was a first string WR, perhaps it would have been caught (then again, it is the Eagles we are talking about). Wentz could have made Graham’s job considerably easier if he put the ball on his numbers, or at least threw it towards the direction in which Graham was heading– i.e., his inside shoulder.

Cleaning up his mechanics during this redshirt season should help with his repetitive accuracy. But it is something to keep an eye on as we progress through the preseason. You can see a couple more examples here and here.

4. Wentz made rookie mistakes, which are to be expected

Wentz put up underwhelming numbers last night: 12-24 passing for 89 yards, 0 touchdowns and 1 interception. This caused more handwringing than I expected, with some calling his performance “rocky” and others snidely saying he was in “preseason form.”

I try not to fixate on rookies making mistakes in their first year, especially at the quarterback position. The learning curve to the NFL is incredibly steep: systems are more complex, players are moving faster, and the magnifying glass you are placed under can be overwhelming at times.

That is especially true for a player like Wentz, who is making the jump from playing FCS football in North freaking Dakota to playing at the highest level of competition in one of the toughest markets in the world.

So when I saw this terrible decision last night — where Wentz forced a throw to a covered receiver deep in the red zone — I tried to keep things in perspective.

Look, I’m not excusing the throw — it was bad — but remember: Peyton Manning threw 28 interceptions to just 26 touchdowns his rookie year. Troy Aikman threw more interceptions than touchdowns in each of his first two seasons. They went on to win a combined five Superbowls during their Hall of Fame careers.

That’s not to suggest Wentz will be nearly as successful as those two (odds are he won’t), but it is to say that we shouldn’t freak out every time the kid throws a pick. If he is still making these mistakes consistently during his second season as a starter, then we should be concerned. Until then, give him time to grow.

Bottom line: I was impressed from the rookie quarterback. He made some good plays, flashed his athleticism, and didn’t look overwhelmed by the moment. Despite his mistakes, I think it was a strong debut. Hopefully we can see more of him in the remaining preseason games.

TYLER ASTON is a contributor at Eagles Rewind. You can follow him on twitter @Astonia67.

The Eagles are in the market for some young backup linebackers. This makes more sense than brining in an over the hill vet on what is effectively a rebuilding team. Najee Goode will be a free agent next year. Joe Walker looked good in the first preseason game but has far from locked up a long term spot. The team gave Myke Tavarres a ton of signing bonus money and he will almost certainly at least make the practice squad, but plays WILL (same position as Goode) and is making a big jump in competition and transitioning positions. Deonte Skinner may make the team but hasn’t exactly been lighting things up during the preseason. Quinten Gause is probably more of a practice squad guy, and bless his heart but I don’t think Don Cherry is going to make it.

Despite all the handwringing about the state of the position, in looking around the league for this post, the birds are probably middle of the pack in terms of overall linebacker depth. The Eagles are most likely in the market for a SAM or MIKE Linebacker. Let’s take a look at some potential options.

LJ Fort: 6’0, 232lbs, 26 years old, STEELERS

Jordan Zumwalt: 6’4, 235lbs, 24 years old, STEELERS

Tyler Matakevich: 6’1, 235lbs, 23 years old, STEELERS

In my opinion the Steelers have the best overall LB depth in the league right now. One or more of these players will be available. Fort played college ball at Northern Iowa but and played a decent chunk for the Browns back in 2012. Has been bouncing around the league since then trying to find a home. Fort has had a very strong showing in Steelers camp and is turning some heads.

Zumwalt was a guy who flashed every time you watched UCLA in 2013. Every game he had a monster hit or bigtime run stuff that made you sit up and pay attention. Considering that UCLA team also had Anthony Barr, Eric Kendricks, and Myles Jack, that is no small feat. The downside is his overall game tape was much more mixed. While he would flash a big play you often wondered about his football IQ. He’s yet to be healthy in the NFL, but has the raw talent. Bit of a project but perhaps a fire and brimstone DC like Schwartz could help him.

Matakevich is the local star. He was the driving force behind Temple’s strong defense last year. Extremely productive college player with high football IQ. He’s a bit small and not terribly athletic which is why he was selected in the seventh round and not where his stat line would have you guess. He’s probably never going to be a starter but for a team like the Eagles having a savvy capable backup MIKE backer to provide insurance for Hicks certainly helps.

Marquis Flowers: 6’3, 250lbs, 24 years old, BENGALS

Flowers started his college career at Arizona as a S. Eventually moved to SAM Linebacker. Came into the league at 6’2 231lbs, but has since grown into that frame. Ran a 4.51 at his pro day. Made the Bengals roster in 2014 and would have last year if not an injury in the final preseason game. The Bengals have a good track record of developing linebacking talent. He seems to have done well this preseason and the Bengals like him, however he just seems to be caught up in a numbers game. Flowers has good size and athleticism to be a modern NFL SAM backer and cover linebackers.

Shaq Petteway: 5’11, 230lbs, 22 years old, CHARGERS

Petteway doesn’t really fit a need for the Eagles, he projects as an undersized WILL in the birds scheme. I bring him up however because the Eagles seemed to like him in the predraft process, and worked him out as a fullback. He stands no chance at making the Chargers roster as a 34 OLB as he’s about 3 inches and 25 pounds from being an undersized pass rusher. Petteway would more be a guy that the birds sign to the practice squad and tinker with at fullback and maybe some defense on the side.

John Timu: 6’0, 245lbs, 23 years old, BEARS

Timu was a two time captain at Washington on units that featured Marcus Peters, Kikaha, Danny Shelton, and Shaq Thompson. Timu started 3 games at the end of last season for the Bears but after heavy investment at the position in the offseason may be on the outside looking in. Timu is the kind of player you look for in a backup MIKE, maybe not the flashiest player but everytime you watch his tape you walk away going “that sumbitch can play football”.

Paul Worrilow: 6’0, 230lbs, 26 years old, FALCONS

Worrilow is the most established player on this list. If the Eagles want a more established player to provide insurance for Hicks, this should be the target not a player in his 30s. He has 230 career tackles, 4 sacks, and 2 INTs. Worrilow was a UDFA from Delaware back in 2013 and because the Falcons were so devoid of talent on defense he became a starter almost immediately and has remained in the lineup. He’s stuffed the stat sheet and has been solid but struggles with missed tackles and basically being the front 7’s best player for 3 years. The Falcons finally invested in the position during the offseason, and seem to be trying to transition him to a backup role this season. Worrilow is basically Atlanta’s LB version of what Nate Allen was to the Eagles, a solid if unspectacular starter but much maligned due to surrounding circumstances. He’s a local guy and could probably use a change of scenery. He’s not going to be cut, but a late conditional and a fringe Eagles roster player could be enough to get Atlanta to part with him.

Jared Norris: 6’1, 240lbs, 23 years old, PANTHERS

Brian Blechen: 6’2, 230lbs, 24 years old, PANTHERS

Jeremy Cash: 6’0, 215lbs, 23 years old, PANTHERS

The Panthers are the one team who could challenge the Steelers for best overall LB depth. Each of these three guys are interesting in their own unique ways. All were team captains, all are high football IQ guys, two were college teammates of Eric Rowe. Norris is the thumper. He’s your classic ILB/MIKE, and was my favorite UDFA at the position this year. Norris should never be a full time starter but has enough of the tools that he should be able to overcome his lack of elite athleticism.

Blechen was on and off the practice squad for Carolina last year, as they were converting him from a jumbo safety to an LB. I noticed Blechen while watching Rowe’s college tape. This S/LB tweener kept flashing. 2 hours later I had built a shrine and sworn my allegiance to him. It was weird. Blechen probably should never play on defense but could become a special teams standout. The Eagles have Maragos at DB, and Braman at DL. The Linebacking room needs a hair on fire special teams standout.

Cash was a college star at Duke. He’s just a weird projection to the NFL. He’s a box safety who didn’t run super fast. 10 years ago he would have been a top 40 pick but he went undrafted. The NFL is starting to find ways to get these types of players on the field in nickel sets, but they simply aren’t as desirable as they once were. Cash could eventually become a starter but if the Eagles brought in Cash they would have to design a role for him, perhaps in the 3-3-5 nickel sets they have been tinkering with during training camp.

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-detroit-lions-head-coach-and-current-buffalo-bills-news-photo/456702204

Patrick Causey, on Twitter @pcausey3 

When Jeffery Lurie fired Chip Kelly last December, he set about a reclamation project for his franchise. In his own words, he needed to “take his team back.” It turns out, “taking his team back” was an euphemism for trying to replicate the Andy Reid era, inarguably the most successful period in franchise history.

Instead of Reid, Lurie hired Reid’s hand-picked protégé, Doug Pederson, who was also a little known offensive coordinator schooled in the traditions of the Bill Walsh West Coast offense. And instead of the venerable Jim Johnson, Lurie hired Jim Schwartz, who also predicates his defense on pressuring the quarterback with an aggressive 4-3 defense. While Johnson relied on exotic blitz packages, Schwartz eschews the blitz in favor of lining his defensive ends in the wide-nine technique — just outside the tight end — where their speed and athleticism advantages over the offensive tackles can shine.

Reid and Johnson. Pederson and Schwartz. Add in a quarterback drafted #2 overall (McNabb/Wentz) and it’s hard not to get swept up in nostalgia.

And while the Pederson hiring was met with skepticism, the Eagles decision to hire Schwartz was met with near-universal praise. But is the unbridled respect justified?

It was a question I sought to answer after I was less impressed than I anticipated looking over Schwartz’s coaching statistics on Pro-Football-Reference.com. Coupled with the Eagles disastrous experiment with the wide nine under Jim Washburn (who practically coined the wide nine working alongside Schwartz in Tennessee), I had legitimate concerns over whether Schwartz could live up to the hype.

So I decided to profile  Jim Schwartz in this piece; studying his scheme and his results on the field. I also try to figure out why Schwartz has several sizable blemishes on his resume, including his early tenure in Tennessee and his stint as head coach of the Detroit Lions, and whether the Eagles have the right personnel to avoid adding another.

In Schwartz’s Words: “We want to attack”

The most common misconception about Schwartz’s scheme is that it is entirely predicated on the “wide nine.” As Mike Rodak of ESPN.com details, Schwartz takes issue with that characterization: 

“Mostly that’s thrown around by people that couldn’t line it up if they wanted to. That’s no disrespect to those people,” Schwartz said. “I’ll say this, there’s 32 teams in the NFL and all 32 line up in a wide nine. Not all of them are called wide nine teams, but that’s just the way it goes.”

Schwartz instead calls his defense an “attack scheme,” a fittingly simple description given his preference for streamlining information so that his defenders are attacking, not thinking or reacting: “It’s not a read-and-react system. It’s not a lateral, line of scrimmage; we want to attack, we want to knock back, we want to put pressure on the quarterback and we want to create negative plays.”

And that is a key distinction between Schwartz and his predecessor, Billy Davis. Davis ran a 3-4, two gap system that required his defensive lineman to read the play, occupy blockers and allow linebackers to wreak havoc in the backfield. But the defense never seemed to fit the Eagles’ personnel. Indeed, for a team whose biggest strength was the defensive line, it seemed illogical to run a scheme that limited their ability to make plays.

That will no longer be the case under Schwartz. Fletcher Cox and Company will be given less information, less responsibility, and more freedom to pin their ears back and get after the quarterback. “There’s going to be a lot of defensive lineman that will be real happy to play in a system like that.” Schwartz once said.

Attacking Through The Wide Nine, Stunts & Blitzes

While Schwartz is right that the wide nine isn’t a defensive scheme (it’s a technique), it would be a mistake to ignore how centrally important the wide nine is to Schwartz’s defense.

In order to understand the wide nine, it’s helpful to understand the basics of gap and technique assignments along the line. As you see below (image courtesy of BleacherReport.com), each offensive lineman is surrounded by gaps: the A gap is on either side of the center, B gap on the outside shoulders of the guards, and C gap on the outside shoulder of the tackles.

Defensive lineman have corresponding techniques, numbered 0 through 9, depending on their position along the offensive line. An even number technique (including zero), means the defensive player is lined up directly over the offensive lineman, an odd number means the defender is on the outside shoulder of the offensive lineman, and an even number with a small i (such as 4i), means the defender is on the inside shoulder of the lineman.

Traditionally, a 4-3 defensive end lines up on the outside shoulder of the offensive tackle in the 6-tech, and is responsible for attacking the C gap. But in Schwartz’s scheme, the defensive ends line up on the outside shoulder of the tight end, in the wide nine, attacking the D gap.

Here is a still shot of the wide nine in action, from Schwartz’s time in Buffalo. Notice how defensive ends Jerry Hughes and Mario Williams are flanking the offensive tackles by a considerable margin:

Lining defensive ends in the wide nine theoretically makes it easier to get to the quarterback; it gives them more space within which to operate, more time to build up speed, and forces the larger — and slower —  offensive lineman to cover more distance. This, in turn, reduces the need for Schwartz to dial up blitzes (which he rarely does), and gives his defense a decided numerical advantage when defending the pass– leaving 7 defenders against, at most, 5 pass catchers.

Here is the wide nine in action. Watch how much trouble Sebastian Vollmer (who is 6’8, 320 lbs and ran a 5.13 40) has keeping up with Mario Williams (who is one of the largest defensive ends in football, but is still smaller (6’6, 300 lbs) and faster (4.73 40) than Vollmer):

Getting Williams in space, and forcing Vollmer to move laterally, is an inherent mismatch that Williams capitalizes on with ease. This athletic mismatch is the key principle upon which the wide nine was built.

But the wide nine isn’t just about turning the corner on tackles. Beat a tackle consistently enough to the outside and they will start to overcompensate to regain outside leverage. That creates fertile ground for the end to attack inside, getting a cleaner, shorter path to the quarterback:

The wide nine also creates favorable matchups for defensive tackles. Albert Haynesworth (8.5), Marcell Dareus (10), Ndamukong Suh (10), and Kyle Williams (10.5) had career high sack totals in Schwartz’s defense thanks in large part to getting one-on-one matchups and more space within which to operate. (Hello, Fletcher Cox):

But, again, while the wide nine is a big part of Schwartz’s defense, it is not the only component. Another way that Schwartz tries to generate pressure without blitzing is through a stunt: a move which requires one defensive lineman to set a pick so that another defensive lineman has a free lane to the quarterback. It is simple, yet sometimes devastating, because offensive lineman fail to recognize the stunt in time to coordinate switching off the pick.

Here is a diagram of the stunt that the Bills ran against the Jets back in 2014. Kyle Williams attacks the outside, setting a pick for Jerry Hughes to cut behind and fill the open lane.

Here it is in live action:

The Jets blocked this play perfectly initially: Bilal Powell (#29) cuts across Michael Vick’s face to block Hughes, and gets help from the left guard, Oday Aboushi, who does a good job passing off Williams to left tackle, D’Brickashaw Ferguson. The only problem? Ferguson completely botches the handoff, giving Williams an easy sack.

Same play, different result. Marcel Dareus attacks the B gap, setting a pick for Hughes to come back around unblocked into the A gap and sack Alex Smith.

Expect to see stunts called at least 2-3 times a game. Schwartz will call variations of the stunts, either with two lineman setting the pick to spring one blitzer, or having the four defensive lineman running stunts on the same play.

While Schwartz would prefer not to blitz, he still does so, and is often very effective at it. In Buffalo, Schwartz sent an extra man on only 20.9 percent of downs, according to Pro Football Focus, which was the 4th lowest rate in the league. But the Bills pressured the quarterback 36.6% of the time when a blitz was dialed up, which was the eight best mark in the NFL.

Bottom line: Schwartz’s scheme is centered on getting sacks without blitzing. In his 14 year career as a head coach or defensive coordinator, his defense has ranked in the top 10 in sacks eight times. Needless to say, I think his scheme is accomplishing that goal.

Turnovers and Third Down Percentage

But Schwartz’s scheme isn’t just about attacking the quarterback. As he told Dave Spadaro of PhiladelphiaEagles.com, Schwartz is also concerned with creating turnovers and having good third down percentages: “We’re going to attack. We’re going to get after the quarterback. We’ve been good in getting sacks and creating turnovers, good on third downs. You know, I’m really not a stat guy, I don’t care how many yards we give up…”

When Schwartz is able to generate pressure on the quarterback without having to blitz, everything else falls into place. That is especially true for his secondary, which benefits from having extra defenders in space. Again, if four defenders are rushing, that leaves seven in pass coverage. Since an offense is already without six players (quarterback and five lineman), that means — in the best case scenario — the pass catchers are out numbered 7-5.

Because of this advantage, Schwartz primarily dials up press man coverage. His cornerbacks have more freedom to take risks and jump routes because they know they have safety help over the top. That combination of pressure on the quarterback and more defenders in pass coverage inevitably leads to more opportunities for turnovers.  Schwartz’s last three years as a defensive coordinator — 2007-08 in Tennessee, and 2014 in Buffalo — underscore this point. That 2007 Titans team ranked 7th in sacks, and 2nd in interceptions, thanks to seven players with at least two interceptions on the season, according to Pro-Football-Reference.com. The 2008 team ranked 5th in sacks, and had three Pro Bowlers in the secondary: safeties Michael Griffin (7 ints) and Chris Hope (4 ints), and cornerback Cortland Finnegan (5 ints). While the 2014 Bills had the most sacks in the league and sixth most interceptions thanks to nine different players with at least one interception. 

The 2008 Titans was the one year I could find where Schwartz’s secondary was loaded with playmakers. Despite lacking elite talent in other years, his teams ranked, on average, in the top 14 in the league in take-aways during his career. That is an encouraging sign for the Eagles given their lack of top quality corners at their disposal.

Schwartz’s scheme also creates good opportunities to get off the field after 3rd down. Simply stated, more sacks means longer distances to cover on third down, which means a lower probability of converting on third down.

Pat Kirwin of NFL.com recently conducted a study of the conversion percentage league wide for certain down and distances. Here is what he found:

It shouldn’t come as a surprise that the longer the distance, the lower the probability of getting a first down. So while you have a coin-flips chance (52%) of converting a 3rd and 2, your odds plummet to 20% for 3rd and 10+.

Intuitively, you would think that the high sack totals would lead to a better third down conversion rate. That’s exactly the case with Schwartz’s defense. In the 14 years as head coach or defensive coordinator, Schwartz’s units have averaged in the top 10 on third down percentages, according to Prof-Football-Reference.com. And according to FootballOutsiders.com, his 2014 Buffalo unit ranked 7th in the league on drives ending in 3-and-outs (24.4%), while his 2007 defense ranked 2nd in such category (27.5% of drives ending in a 3-and-out).

Sacks. Take-aways. Getting stops on third downs. Those are the three areas that Schwartz prioritizes on defense. Expect to those priorities translate on the field this fall.

You can continue reading Part II here.

The Eagles drafted the future of the franchise last night after trading up to pick number 2 to select Carson Wentz from North Dakota State. They gave up alot of draft capital in order to do so. Howie Roseman and Doug Pederson have staked their jobs to his performance. So now it’s about protecting their investment. They have brought in a bevy of QB coaches to help him develop. They plan on being patient with him. There is an old adage that a good Tight End is a the best friend of a young QB. The Eagles have three young Wide Recievers and solid depth at the position.

The best way for the Eagles to protect their new Quarterback is to invest in the offensive line. The first reason is obvious, plenty of young signal callers have taken large amounts of punishment playing behind poor offensive lines. This led to developing bad habits: footwork breaks down, they start to see ghosts, they stop seeing the whole field and focusing on not getting hit. Additionally they can just outright get hurt.

The second reason Offensive Line is crucial for a young QB is being able to establish a strong run game. Ideally you don’t want a QB to have to go out and take fifty 7-step drops to try to win a shootout.

The Current State of the Eagles Offensive Line

The Eagles OL in 2015 was not good. They gave up too much pressure and struggled to run the ball. This was compounded by a constantly rotating lineup with injuries taking a major toll. The good news is that the new scheme will lighten some of the burden. Play calling will be more diverse. The Tackles will get more help from running backs and tight ends in pass protection. The run scheme will be a more balanced selection of gap scheme and zone scheme in contrast to the pure zone run during the Chip Kelly regime. They also went out and signed two new potential starters.

The presumed starting 5 looks something like:

Jason Peters – Stefen Wisniewski – Jason Kelce – Brandon Brooks – Lane Johnson

That’s a solid starting 5, but has alot of long term questions, and won’t be in anyone’s top 5 rankings of the position groups. Jason Peters is a potential Hall of Famer, but is 34, has been unable to stay healthy the last couple of years, and seems to have lost a step. Peters is expensive and unlikely to be on the roster past this season. Wisniewski is the presumptive starter at LG, and is a solid starter but is only here on a one year contract, and has not played Guard since his rookie year in Oakland. Jason Kelce is one of the most unique centers in the NFL. His athleticism and ability to play in space make him a weapon. He has been up and down the last couple of years but is still a solid starter and should bounce back in 2016. Brandon Brooks was brought in from a scheme in Houston that ran a combination of both zone and gap schemes, and should fit from that perspective. He’s a mountain of a man at 6’5 345lbs, and when he’s on, can move people against their will in the run game. Lane Johnson is the former #4 overall pick and signed a lucrative extension to stay with the Eagles in the off season. He is the future Left Tackle. He’s been good so far in his career but has yet to take the next step to becoming a great player.

The Reserves: Allen Barbre, Matt Tobin, Dennis Kelly, and Andrew Gardener have all started for the Eagles during stretches of the last few seasons. They are all solid reserves. However the Eagles would certainly like to get younger and try to develop some young OL with higher upside.

The Deep Reserves: Josh Andrews was the backup Center last year. He can play some guard, but has a pretty limited ceiling and has never started. Brett Boyko was a UDFA who made the practice squad last year. If the Eagles do not bring in much help during the draft he could push Dennis Kelly to be the swing tackle. Barret Jones was a highly decorated OL coming out of Alabama, but has yet to start a game is JAG. The coaching staff seems to like Malcolm Bunche. He has a good profile. I worry about him though because he has been and underachiever with great tools his whole career. Both at Miami and UCLA he forced his way into the starting lineup only to be extremely underwhelming.

So the 4 things the Eagles could use, they won’t be able to get them all but this is my wishlist:

1. A Tackle who can start this year when Peters inevitably gets hurt.
2. A Guard to push Wisniewski for the starting LG job.
3. A C/G to push Kelce and improve depth
4. A swing tackle of the future

Offensive Line Prospects:

Here are some players who I think fit both the scheme, needs, and should still be available.

Joe Haeg, T, NDSU 6’6 304lbs

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/offensive-lineman-joe-haeg-of-north-dakota-state-in-action-news-photo/513715862

What better place to find a guy to protect Carson Wentz than the guy who has been doing it already? Haeg was a walk on in the same class as Wentz, started at Right Tackle for two seasons before kicking over to Left Tackle the last two. He reminds me alot of former Eagle Todd Herremans. Both are good technically, played at smaller schools, can play LT in a pinch and have T/G versatility. Haeg could compete at LG in 2016 and then kick out to RT in 2017.

Max Tuerk, C, USC, 6’5, 298lbs

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/center-max-tuerk-of-the-usc-trojans-during-the-college-news-photo/458523470

What would happen if you took Jason Kelce’s movement ability, added in Lane Johnon’s frame and sprinkled in Jon Runyan’s desire to give a little extra after the whistle blew? Ladies and gentlemen, I give you Max Tuerk. Tuerk was a 4 year starter at USC. He played just about every position while he was there. He’s got a rare combination of feet, size, and movement ability. He can probably play all 5 offensive line positions (short arms make LT iffy). If Tuerk hadn’t torn his ACL last fall I believe he would have gone in the later part of the first round. He could go anywhere from just outside the top 40 to the top of the fourth round, depending on how teams view his knee and positional future.

Connor McGovern, G, Mizzou, 6’4 306lbs

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/offensive-lineman-connor-mcgovern-of-the-missouri-tigers-news-photo/498619652

Connor McGovern is just the latest of really good Mizzou OL. Justin Britt and Mitch Morse were both 2nd round picks in 2014 and 2015. Morse just happened to become the starting Center and a homerun pick for Kansas City. His OC was some guy named Doug Pederson. McGovern is a 3 year starter having played RG, RT, and LT. He’s probably more of a guard than tackle in the NFL but in the right scheme could play some out on the edge. He’s technical and strong. High football IQ. He’s got a bit of piss and vinegar to him. When people say “you can find good guards in round 3” McGovern is who they are talking about.

Christian Westerman, G, Arizona State, 6’3, 298lbs

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/offensive-lineman-christian-westerman-of-the-arizona-state-news-photo/488776046

Westerman is a player I struggle with. He’s a good athlete, freak in the weightroom, and solid on the football field. He checks every box you want, yet I always finish watching his film confused. He’s good. He should be better. He’s like a 5 tool baseball player who hits .265 and 15 home runs. That’s good, but you’ll always kinda wish they would hit .290 and 30 dingers. Maybe NFL coaching will help him. He could just as likely make half a dozen pro bowls as be a guy who turns out like Wisniewski.

Alex Lewis, T, Nebraska, 6’6 314lbs

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/alex-lewis-from-nebraska-playing-on-the-west-team-during-news-photo/506941588

Lewis is a guy who started his career at Colorado. He arrived as a TE, but was moved to OL as a sophomore and started at LG and LT. Then things got weird. Lewis did 45 days in prison for a bar brawl where he put an Air Force Cadets head through a wall. He transferred to Nebraska and has started ever since, and things seemed to have settled downo off the field. On the field he has solid feet, and good size with long arms. He isn’t the most powerful guy but has enough. He reminds me alot of Michael Schofield. If his background checks out he is a good developmental T who could be the starting RT in 2015. Let’s just hope the judge was right in saying: “I have no doubt alcohol was a major factor here,” Butler said. “This was a classic example of too much alcohol, too much testosterone, bad result. I see it almost daily.”

Graham Glasgow, C, Michigan, 6’6, 307lbs

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/quarterback-shane-morris-of-the-michigan-wolverines-warms-news-photo/460591367

Glasgow is a very tall guy for an interior OL. But he plays with great pad level. He’s a powerful guy, with solid not good athletic ability. He has experience starting both at guard and center over the last three years. To me he profiles best as a G early in his career, he doesn’t sit in the seat well in pass pro and playing him at G should minimize these issues while he works on some range of motion and technical tweaks.  Needs to do a better job staying on his feet. He got much better as a football player after Harbaugh arrived. He went from a guy with DUI issues who was pretty average to a good interior OL, and Harbaugh mandated that he be roommates with his grandmother to keep him out of trouble. I love that.

Joe Thuney, G/C, NC State, 6’5, 304lbs

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/matt-dayes-and-joe-thuney-of-the-north-carolina-state-news-photo/460850376

Another guy who has played absolutely everywhere. Made starts at RG, RT, C, and LT. Another guy with great technique, and a high football IQ. Academic All-American. Not the most powerful but wins with his brains. Profiles best as a backup G/C in the short term with a solid shot at becoming a starter down the line. Think of a rich mans Julian Vandervelde.

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/quarterback-trent-edwards-quarterback-mike-kafka-and-news-photo/150082142

A combination of bad scouting and attempting to band-aid the QB position forced the Eagles to trade up to number two.

Patrick Causey, on Twitter @pcausey3

I was going to provide my thoughts on the Eagles trade, but was buried in work and couldn’t get to it in time while the topic was still relevant. There are some really good articles out there analyzing both sides of the debate, including Bill Barnwell’s skeptical view of the move, and James Keane of BGN.com explaining why the Eagles did not mortgage the future in this trade. (For the record, I am against the trade up for this QB prospect, which I explain more fully here).

Instead, I want to address the root cause for the Eagles having to make this trade. But first, analogy time.

Imagine for a moment that the Philadelphia Eagles are a house.

They invested big in a brand new roof back in 1999. It was top of the line and came with all the bells and whistles. And for about 10 years, that roof was incredible. It did almost everything the homeowners could ask for.

But then the roof started to show signs of wear and tear. Instead of fixing the problem, the homeowners just ignored it.

And ignored it.

And ignored it.

Years went by. They put a bandaid here and a did patch job there.

But they never invested the necessary money to fix the actual problem.

Then one day the homeowners came home after a big storm, and the roof had caved in. Now they not only needed a new roof, but they needed to buy new appliances and furniture. So they went all out again, spending huge money to fix the problem. The only problem is, they ended up spending twice as much as they would have needed to spend had they just fixed the problem when the signs first emerged.

As you’ve probably guessed by now, that bad analogy was my attempt at illustrating the Eagles approach to solving the most important position in football: the quarterback.

The Eagles invested a high first round pick in Donovan McNabb back in 1999. He lasted 10 years with the team, leading the Eagles to five NFC Championship games and a Super Bowl. It was the longest period of sustained success in franchise history, and McNabb will go down as the best quarterback in franchise history.

But since the Eagles traded McNabb to the Washington Redskins in the 2010 offseason, they’ve wholly neglected the quarterback position. Instead of investing a high draft pick when the opportunity presented itself (which history tells us is the smart thing to do), the Eagles opted to go with retread veterans and mid-round picks, and the results were predictably mediocre.

Here is a chart breaking down the number of draft picks the Eagles have had since 2010 and the amount of those picks they have used on quarterbacks:

Two things stand out from this list. First, despite the commonly accepted view that more picks > less picks, the Eagles have steadily declined in the number of draft picks they’ve had over the last six years (they have only 7 this year). That’s not good.

But more pertinent to this article, they have taken only three quarterbacks in the last six drafts: Mike Kafka (2010), Nick Foles (2012), and Matt Barkley (2013). They’ve had 54 draft picks during that time. That’s 5% of their picks put towards solving the most important position in football.

And this was all while the Eagles projected starters were Kevin Kolb, Michael Vick, Nick Foles, and Sam Bradford. Not one quarterback on that list is considered an above replacement level quarterback in the NFL (and Kolb and Foles aren’t even close to being replacement level).

For comparisons sake, the New England Patriots also took three quarterbacks in the draft during the same time period (on 55 picks). The only difference, of course, is that they had Tom Brady as their quarterback.

But this is not even really about the quantity of picks they spent. My primary concern is about the lack of quality picks that the Eagles have invested in the position. The three quarterbacks they drafted since 2010 were in the third, fourth and fourth rounds respectively.

One way to better contextualize value is to use the draft value chart for the picks the Eagles used on quarterbacks since 2010:

Assume for a moment that the Eagles have had 7 picks in each of the last six drafts, and they picked 15th each time. They would have 1,811.50 “points” each draft, or 10,869 total points worth of draft capital over the last six drafts. The 308 points the Eagles invested in the quarterback position is just 2% of their total draft stock during that time.

Now, this comparison isn’t perfect. The Eagles didn’t pick 15th every year and they didn’t have just seven picks (they usually picked in the 20s, but also frequently had more than 7 picks, so I think the value evens out). But it still provides a good illustration to the problem: they’ve invested so little in the quarterback position that we shouldn’t be surprised the position has been mired in mediocrity for the last six seasons.

Again, for comparisons sake, the Patriots used a second rounder on Jimmy Garoppolo after the Patriots went 12-4 the previous year. After they went 14-2 in 2010, they used a third rounder on Ryan Mallett. They also used a 7th round pick on Zac Robinson in 2010. Using that same math, the Patriots spent 506 points worth of draft capital compared to the Eagles 308.

AND THIS WAS WITH TOM BRADY ON THE ROSTER!

Good franchises plan ahead and invest in the position as their quarterback is starting to age. Drafting Garoppolo while Brady is setting the world on fire is a good example of this. Ditto the Pittsburgh Steelers drafting Big Ben 11th overall in 2004 while Tommy Maddox, who led the Steelers to the Super Bowl, was still on the roster. The Green Bay Packers were riding high with Brett Favre when they took Aaron Rodgers in the first round of the 2005 NFL Draft.

The Eagles were presented with, but failed to take advantage of, similar opportunities to draft a quarterback at a much more reasonable cost than the one paid to acquire Carson Wentz:

2011: The Eagles were coming off 10-6 season with Michael Vick as the starter. But Vick was never as good as people made him about to be: he had an inconsistent season that year, starting off very good but crashing down to earth once defenses started to bring pressure more consistently and take away his first read. In the first round, the Eagles took Danny Watkins (yikes). Andy Dalton and Colin Kaepernick were still on the board.

2012: The Eagles reportedly built his entire draft class around acquiring Russell Wilson. They had a first round grade on him and three picks in the first two rounds. Instead of grabbing Wilson with, say, the second 2nd round pick, the Eagles drafted Vinny Curry, hoping to grab Wilson in the third. We know the history: Seattle took Wilson one pick before the Eagles, who ended up trading back in the 3rd and drafting Nick Foles instead.

2014: Coming off Nick Foles’ 27/2 season, the Eagles were content to go with Foles and former starter Michael Vick as their quarterback. When they drafted first round bust Marcus Smith with the 26th overall pick, Teddy Bridgewater and Derek Carr were still on the board.

Some might claim this is hindsight 20/20 talking here. Perhaps to an extent. But I also think it underscores two issues that have plagued the Eagles during the last six seasons: they have neglected the quarterback position in the draft and have been poor at scouting quarterbacks when they tried to address the position. So this isn’t just to say that picking Foles was a bad move (in fairness, he likely has outperformed most third round quarterbacks). It also extends to their inability to recognize that Vick was not a viable solution in 2011, Foles in 2014, and so on and so forth.

So while we can — and should — debate the merits and demerits of the Eagles decision to trade up to two, we cannot dispute that the Eagles forced themselves into this position by neglecting the most important position in football for the last six years. And for that, they have only themselves to blame.

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/quarterback-carson-wentz-of-north-dakota-state-in-action-news-photo/513972756

Carson Wentz is a prototypical boom or bust quarterback prospect. He has the size, athleticism and arm strength you want, but needs significant work on his mechanics. I’d hesitate to take him in the top 5 of the draft.

Patrick Causey,on Twitter @pcausey3

When the last whistle blows and a new college football champion is crowned, NFL coaches, executives and scouts turn their attention to what is derisively known as the “beauty pageant” season.

Between that final game and the NFL draft, prospects are judged through a number of events that do not involve football players actually playing football: from the combine, to pro days, to individual workouts and team interviews. Prospects are measured, perform scripted plays in ideal conditions, and conduct job interviews under the same confines as speed dating.

NFL teams spend inordinate resources scouting players, investigating their background for red flags, and relying on advanced analytics to project their games to the pros. Yet, without fail, teams get seduced by prospects that excel during the beauty pageant phase of the draft process. Reports emerge about prospects rocketing up draft boards because of a great combine workout or because that “It” factor that shined during interviews, warts in their tape be damned

Two quick examples.

Leading up to the 2003 draft, Kyle Boller was an inaccurate quarterback with a fringe first round grade. During his pro day, Boller wowed scouts, coaches and executives with his athleticism (4.59 40 time) and by completing 96% of his passes, including a 75 yard bomb on the run.

But as Michael Wong of BleacherReport.com explained, the deal sealer came after the workout was over. “After his official workout had come to it’s conclusion, Kyle Boller proceeded to drop to his knees, exactly on the 50 yard line, and toss one of the most beautiful spirals I have ever seen cleanly through the field goal posts. Sixty yards away.”

As Brian Billick acknowledged many years later, after seeing this workout and that throw, the Ravens brass convinced themselves that Boller’s inaccuracy was the result of his subpar teammates. So they traded up in the first round to draft him 19th overall, only to watch him fail to live up to the hype. Apparently throwing from your knees at midfield is not required to be a successful NFL quarterback.

In 2009, Mark Sanchez was leaving dinner with Rex Ryan and Jets general manager Mike Tannenbaum following his private workout with the team. They were walking towards their cars when Sanchez hopped on a nearby motorcycle, grabbed the helmet, and said to the stunned group “All right, I’ll see you guys later.” When Sanchez laughed and revealed the bike was not his, Ryan and Tannenbaum were convinced that his willingness to pull off that prank during the biggest job interview of his life revealed that Sanchez had the “It” factor needed to lead their team. The Jets traded up to the 5th overall pick to get Sanchez; even though his tape and numbers never justified such a lofty draft status.

Which brings me to Carson Wentz: I have never met him, but I watched all of his 2015 tape. I see a mid to late first round talent that needs considerable work on his mechanics and consistency. If it all pans out? He could be a stud. But that’s a big if; Wentz needs at least one year to fix his game, possibly more, and there is no guarantee that these issues can be ironed out.

So I was surprised to see the Wentz-hype following the combine. Reports emerged that he crushed the team interviews, flashing his moxxy and intelligence that allowed him to get a 40 on the Wonderlick test. Pretty soon, Wentz was drawing comparisons to once-in-a-generation prospect Andrew Luck:

When Wentz put on a clinic at his pro day, NFL analysts were tripping over themselves with the compliments:

I am not suggesting that I am right and these analysts are wrong; some of them have been around the NFL longer than I have been alive. But if Ozzie Newsome, one of the best general managers in NFL history, can be seduced by the allure of a kneeling 60-yard bomb during a pro day, these analysts are equally susceptible to the hype surrounding Wentz.

Before we break down why I think Wentz is not a top 5 pick, here is a quick table highlighting his strengths and weaknesses:

By the Numbers

Went’z stats were deflated because he suffered a broken bone in his throwing hand that limited Wentz to only 7 games on the season:

Here’s Wentz’s accuracy chart, courtesy of Ian Wharton at BleacherReport.com:

Wentz’s struggles on intermediate and deep throws are apparent: he completed only 53% of his passes while maintaining an impressive 8 touchdown to 1 interception ratio. While those aren’t horrible numbers by any stretch, they are not as impressive as Jared Goff’s numbers, especially on the deep ball. Whereas Goff completed 53, 75 and 48 percent of his passes on deep throws, Wentz completed only 25, 63 and 33 percent of such passes.

Here is Wentz’s spider chart, courtesy of MockDraftTable.com:

Wentz checks all of the boxes from a size and athleticism standpoint, ranking in the top 20% of all quarterbacks in height, weight, broad jump, 3 cone drill, 20 yard shuttle, and arm length (for whatever that’s worth).

But the tape is where the red flags really start to emerge.

Breaking Down the Tape

Mechanical Issues

Wentz has significant issues with his passing mechanics. These issues did not hamper his production in college because he was just that much better than his competition. But in the NFL, proper mechanics are paramount. Passing windows and the margin for error shrink considerably from big time college football, let alone Division 1-AA. So while Wentz was able to skate by against the likes of Weber State and Northern Iowa, he will struggle significantly against the Seattle Seahawks or Pittsburgh Steelers trying to throw only with his arm.

Here is a prime example of Wentz throwing with just his arm and neglecting any semblance of mechanical integrity with his feet, hips or legs.

Here is a close up of what I am talking about; Wentz’s entire lower body is statue-esque, with no rotation towards the receiver.

Here is another example; Wentz completed the pass, but it’s about the process, not the results:

There are other times that Wentz tried to have proper mechanics but stopped short halfway through the process. Let’s break this down by still shots.

Here is Wentz’s initial set-up. There is nothing wrong here. His head is facing his target, he has good bend in his knees, his shoulders are even, his legs are shoulder width apart and the ball looks to be held close to his body in ready position:

After that, though, things start to go sideways:

Ideally, you want the legs to maintain integrity here and be shoulder-width apart. This might seem like nitpicking, but if you set up your legs too far apart, you lose accuracy and power — and at the NFL level, that makes all the difference.

While his stance was a relatively minor issue, this next frame — taken immediately after Wentz releases the football — raises a lot of flags:

Wentz should have rotated through his throw, ending up with his throwing shoulder facing the receiver and his back plant leg following through in like manner. Instead, Wentz stays open to the receiver, stopping his rotation after he initially releases the football. It should come as no surprise that Wentz missed his intended receiver on this throw.

These mechanical flaws should give pause for concern to any team looking to find a quarterback that can start from Day 1. They aren’t impossible to overcome, but it is going to take considerable work and time for Wentz to break free from his old habits and learn how to throw the football properly without having to think about it.

Accuracy Issues

Given the issues with his mechanics, it should come as no surprise that Wentz struggles with repetitive accuracy.

Those issues are most pronounced when Wentz tries to throw deep. More often than not, Wentz missed his receivers badly — often by 3-5 yards or more:

Wentz doesn’t even give the receiver a chance to make a play here. Without going overkill on this issue, here are three other examples of Wentz badly missing on the deep pass, click: here, here and here

But the accuracy issues aren’t limited to the long ball. Wentz is not a “precision” passer — at least at a consistent enough basis — that can put the ball where only his receiver can catch it.

This is an easy 10 yard out; the receiver has enough separation but Wentz throws the ball to the inside shoulder, forcing the receiver to turn back around and giving the defender an easy chance to make a play.

On this play, Wentz has a back breaking wide open out of the flat, but his bad ball placement forces the back to adjust and miss the opportunity for an easy score.

While that might seem like nitpicking, realize that it was third down and ND State had to settle for a field goal. Precision matters, especially in the NFL, and until Wentz fixes his mechanics he will continue to have these issues.

Examples of Good Mechanics Leading to Good Results

There is hope, however. There were times that Wentz was fundamentally sound and the results were very impressive. I suspect that when Wentz’s supporters project him to be a franchise quarterback, they are primarily relying on throws like this.

Wentz’s mechanics were on point here, from the footwork to the rotation in his hips and shoulders. Not surprisingly, the ball placement was perfect, only his receiver didn’t hold up his end of the bargain and dropped the pass.

Here is another good example; watch as Wentz climbs the pocket and delivers a strike to his receiver:

I think you get the point, but if you want to see more examples from the tape, check these throws out: here, here, here, here and here.

Throwing on the Run

When Wentz is forced to throw on the run, it often isn’t a pretty result. He tends to try to only use his arm, which leads to… well, this:

Wentz does better when he is forced to step up in the pocket away from pressure.

That is a ridiculous pass. Compare the two prior passes: the thing that stands out the most is the direction in which Wentz is moving. On the first pass he pulls up and arms the throw; on the second throw he continues moving forward, which all but forces better mechanics: it prevents Wentz from standing still and not using his legs on the throw.

The other thing that is obvious — and not surprising — is that Wentz is far more comfortable running a bootleg to his right than the left side of the field. That is to be expected since Wentz is right handed:

Strong Athlete

Mike Mayock recently compared Wentz’s athleticism to Andrew Luck and Cam Newton. I agree. Wentz is very athletic for a player his size, and North Dakota State routinely took advantage of that athleticism with designed quarterback runs:

Here is another example of Wentz using his athleticism:

More examples are here and here. Given Wentz’s size — he’s 6’6, 235 lbs — there is less concern about injury. He should be able to withstand the beating that he will take from running, although he has also shown the ability to slide when necessary.

Standing Tall in the Pocket

One area that I have no concern with is Wentz’s ability to handle pressure. He routinely stood tall in the pocket and delivered an accurate pass despite knowing the hit was coming.

I legitimately have no idea how Wentz’s knee is still intact after this play

You can see another example here.

Tendency to Lock onto His Primary Receiver

If there were two areas where Goff has outperformed Wentz significantly, it’s with the deep ball pass and his ability to work through his progressions. Goff excels in both regards, Wentz is a work in progress.

I struggled to find examples of Wentz working through his progressions. The norm was Wentz locking on to his primary receiver and forcing the throw regardless of whether he was open. However, he has flashed the ability to do so:

Watch Wentz’s head. He starts looking to his primary option on the top part of the screen, then quickly moves to the center of the field where the slot receiver was running a post. Wentz steps up into the pocket and delivers a strike for a huge gain. Again, the hype around Wentz is somewhat defensible given his ability to flash plays like this.

A final example. The video stream broke down, but you should still be able to see how Wentz starts with his initial read, bounces outside to avoid pressure, and keeps his eyes down field so he can find the open receiver:

It bears repeating that this was the exception to the norm. Wentz routinely targeted his primary option, but he at least flashed some ability to move to his second and third options.

Conclusion

Carson Wentz is a boom or bust prospect. He has the size, athleticism, arm strength and apparent intangibles that you look for in a franchise quarterback. But he needs considerable work on his mechanics from top to bottom. These mechanical issues affect almost every part of his game, from the short to intermediate to deep throws, to throwing on the run. Until Wentz cleans these issues up, he will never reach his full potential. But if he gets drafted into a spot that allows him to sit for a year or two and clean up the finer points of his game, he could turn into a star.

Bottom line, I would be hesitant to use a top 5 pick on a player with this many holes in his game. I’d consider him at 8 for the Eagles, but even then I would be hesitant. I think he should go in picks 10-15, but will likely go much higher given the dearth of quality quarterbacks in this class.

http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jared-goff-of-the-california-golden-bears-looks-for-an-open-news-photo/502826380

Jared Goff Is Not An Elite Signal Caller Worth Trading Up To The Top Of The Draft. But He Has The Potential To Be A Top 15 QB, So He’s A Quarterback that the Eagles Should Target.

Patrick Causey, on Twitter @pcausey3

Compile a greatest hits tape of Jared Goff’s 2015 season, and you’d see a blue chip prospect destined for greatness: his accuracy, deft touch on deep passes, functional mobility in the pocket and ability to manipulate defenders with his eyes are truly sights to behold. But if you dig a little deeper in the tape, the warts start to emerge: his inconsistent mechanics, head-scratching interceptions, and odd habit of miss-firing on open receivers should give any franchise pause for concern.

Bottom line: Goff has all of the tools you want in a quarterback: the accuracy, vision, work ethic, intelligence; and if he gets under the right coach in the right scheme, he could become an elite quarterback.

But odds are he won’t ever reach that ceiling. He is too inconsistent to be considered an elite prospect or project as an elite signal caller. The safer bet is that Goff turns into a top 15 quarterback in the league, which, as we have discussed before, is what you need to realistically compete for a Super Bowl.

So while I wouldn’t mortgage the future to trade up to the top of the draft to get Goff — cough, St. Louis, cough — I would strongly consider making a move if he slips out of the top four picks. Let’s break this down by the numbers and game tape.

By The Numbers

Raw Numbers and Accuracy Chart

Goff’s raw numbers are impressive, especially when considered in the context in which they were achieved: without a competent offensive line or legitimate skill players. Here are his raw 2015 stats, courtesy of Sports-Reference.com:

But as you know, raw numbers in college can be misleading. That is especially true with completion percentage, where even middling prospects can put up gaudy numbers by completing a high percentage of passes within 10 yards of the line of scrimmage and feasting on the weaker opponents on their schedule.

A better way to judge how a quarterback’s accuracy translates to the NFL is to break his throws down by distance and location on the field. This shows whether a quarterback is able to complete “NFL type throws” — i.e., those beyond 10 yards and outside the numbers.

This chart courtesy of Ian Wharton at BleacherReport.com illustrates how proficient Goff is with NFL type throws:

As you can see, Goff has strong numbers on deep and intermediate throws. On deep throws, Goff completes 53, 75 and 48 percent of his passes.  We also see that these high numbers aren’t the result of small sample sizes: Goff attempted 88 passes that traveled beyond 20 yards. That represents 17% of his passes on the year.

Goff also performed well in the mid-range throws, completing 78, 69 and 62 percent of his passes, respectively. When we combine Goff’s throws of 11+ yards, we see an impressive total: 110/174, 63%,18 touchdowns, 9 interceptions. These numbers suggest that Goff won’t struggle with the transition to the NFL.

College Comps:

Spend a few hours googling scouting reports on Goff and you will come away with a broad range of quarterback comps: from Aaron Rodgers to Matt Ryan to Brian Hoyer and Jake Locker. (Hint, the hyperlink takes you to each report).

So I thought it would be helpful to compare Goff’s 2015 season to some of his contemporaries. Static will always exist with these types of comparisons, since each quarterback played on teams with varying talent levels and against different quality of opponents. But the numbers still give us some baseline from which to draw accurate comparisons.

Here is how Goff’s last season in college compares to the same seasons for Andrew Luck, Marcus Mariota, Jameis Winston, Jake Locker, Blaine Gabbert, and Matt Ryan.

Goff

Andrew Luck

Marcus Mariota

Jameis Winston

Jake Locker

Blaine Gabbert

Matt Ryan

Goff’s TD/INT ratio is obviously impressive, but so to are his yards per attempt and adjusted yards per attempt. His numbers are behind only Marcus Mariota, but ahead of everyone else — including Andrew Luck. That’s important because it reaffirms that Goff wasn’t dinking and dunking his way to gaudy numbers like, perhaps, Blaine Gabbert or Jake Locker.

And from a big picture perspective, these numbers suggest that Goff is more Luck/Winston/Mariota than he is Gabbert/Locker.

But I’m hesitant to put him on the level of Luck, Winston and Mariota because of some of the  inconsistencies that I alluded to earlier.

Against Utah, Goff went 25/47 for 340 yards, 2 touchdowns and 5 interceptions. Against Oregon, Goff threw for 329 yards and 2 touchdowns, but he only completed 43.9% of his passes and threw an interception.

Luck’s season was more consistent in that regard — while he did not have any 5+ touchdown/0 int  performances like Goff had against Air Force and Arizona State — he didn’t have the ugly games like Utah on his schedule either. Indeed, Luck did not have any game in which he: (1) completed less than 60% of his passes or (2) threw more interceptions than touchdowns. Philadelphia’s favorite adopted son, Marcus Mariota, only had one.

Goff had three.

If we break the comparisons down into further detail, however, Goff still comes out favorably to most of his peers:

From a statistical standpoint, these numbers suggest that the Locker and Gabbert comps are off-base. Goff likely rests just below Luck, Mariota and Winston; a projection I am comfortable making because it is backed up by the film.

Breaking Down The Film

Goff’s game tape matches his numbers, filled with some “WOW” throws followed by some head scratchers. As a full disclosure, I watched the following game tape of Goff for this scouting report: ASU, Airforce, Utah, USC, Stanford, San Diego State and Texas.

Here is a quick chart breaking down his strengths and weaknesses, with analysis and game tape that follows.

Strengths

Mid-range Accuracy

Goff excels in the short to intermediate passing game, with precise ball placement on slants, hooks, and quick outs. The tape is filled with countless examples of Goff hitting receivers in stride, enabling them to gain yards after the catch.

One of the most impressive throws was this back shoulder throw against Air Force, which Goff completed despite having pressure bearing down:

Deep Ball Perfection

As we saw above, Goff excels with deep passing, especially on loft passes outside the numbers and up the seam.

But I’ll take the compliment a step further: Goff is the best deep ball thrower in this class, and one of the better deep ball throwers to come along in recent memory. It was almost impossible for me to narrow this list down — he seemed to complete at least 2-3 great deep balls per game.

Let’s start with this pass against Air Force:

For those of you counting at home, that’s a 60 yard pass hitting a receiver perfectly in stride. Goff released this ball right before he got hit — another thing in which he excels — and his receiver did not have to adjust his arms or slow down to make the catch.

This is one of my favorite throws from Goff, again against Air Force:

Goff is able to drop the ball on a dime between the safety and corner for the touchdown. Here is another angle:

One final throw, this time a 40 yard bomb for a touchdown against Utah:

As you can see, Goff’s accuracy and timing on deep throws is impressive. As we saw last year with Sam Bradford, when a quarterback refuses — or simply can’t — attack a defense deep it clogs up the offense. The defense jams wide receivers at the line without fear of the deep ball. NFL defenses will be hard pressed to do that against Goff; he consistently shows the ability to deliver the ball accurately and with good timing.

Pocket Mobility and Keeping his Eyes Down Field

One of the more underrated skills in a quarterback is the ability to navigate the pocket while keeping your eyes down the field. Too often we see quarterbacks who drop their heads when they sense pressure, or worse, take off before they let a play develop.

Goff does not have that issue, and next to his deep passing, this is probably the area in which Goff excels the most.

Against Utah, Goff was able to elude pressure with this spin move and complete a pass for the first down:

Watch as Goff scans to his right, senses the pressure coming, spins away and still has the wherewithal to get to his next read on the opposite side of the field.

I cannot show you the full context of this next play against Arizona State because the Vine cut short, but it is still worth showing:

For the curious minds, Goff ends up completing the pass for a first down. Watch his head closely; outside of when the defender almost tackles him to the ground, he never lowers his eyes to see the pressure. He consistently looks down field for the open receiver despite having defenders swarming all around him. That is some Aaron Rodgers/Big Ben/Tony Romo-esque maneuvers in the pocket.

Manipulating Defense With Eyes

Another area that Goff excels is his ability to manipulate defenders with his eyes and by using pump fakes. There are NFL quarterbacks who have not mastered this skill — cough, Geno Smith — cough, but Goff has shown no aversion to doing this at the collegiate level.

This angle doesn’t let you appreciate how Goff holds the safety on the opposite side of the field. But you will see that safety come crashing into the screen at the last minute, unable to stop the touchdown pass. That’s because of Goff looking to the left side of the field, which prevented the safety from providing help over the middle.

Grace Under Fire/Arm Strength/Throwing on the Move

To avoid going over board here, I am going to combine the last three categories into two throws. Goff consistently showed the ability to complete passes with pressure bearing down on him, as he did with this strike against San Diego State:

Goff quickly works through his progressions, senses the pressure and still has the ability to step into his throw and deliver a strike 25 yards down the field. While Goff’s arm strength will never be mistaken for Joe Flacco or Jay Cutler, we see here that he has plenty of strength to make all of the throws required in pro football.

Here is another good example of Goff’s arm strength, coupled with his ability to throw from awkward arm angles/while on the move:

Notice that Goff is moving to his left — which is never easy for a right handed quarterback to do — and still has enough zip to complete a pass 25 yards down field.

Here is a better view of the angle at which Goff delivers the football:

Plays often break down in the NFL, requiring a quarterback to improvise and deliver a ball from less than ideal positions. Goff flashes enough arm talent and strength to make those awkward throws.

Weaknesses

Despite all the talent in the world, Goff can be sporadic with his accuracy and short arm throws that lead to interceptions. I chalk this up to two issues. The first one I am reasonably confident in: Goff’s mechanics break down at times when facing pressure, leading to inaccurate throws or throws that lack power. The second one is more of a creeping suspicion, but it is the only explanation I can think of for when he miss-fires despite not being under pressure: Goff’s small hand sizes.

Faulty Mechanics

Like any quarterback, Goff’s mechanics can slip when he faces pressure, as it did here against Air Force:

Ideally, Golf would have his front shoulder facing his intended target and step through his throw towards his receiver. But if you look closely enough you can see that Golf’s body is parallel to the line of scrimmage when he releases the football. Inconsistent mechanics begets inconsistent results.

Hand Size

But there are other times where Goff simply misses on passes despite having a clean pocket and no obvious problem with his mechanics. My best guess — and this is just a guess — is that Goff’s hand size is causing him problems.

Goff’s hands measured at 9 inches at the NFL combine, causing a buzz on social media and among NFL teams. For those of you that think fixating on the difference between a 1/2 inch is silly, consider this: according to ESPN.com Insider, only 22 quarterbacks since 2008 — i.e., less than 10 percent of those at the combine  — had hands that measured 9 inches or less. The only quarterback to have success as a start is Ryan Tannehill. Outside of that, the quarterbacks haven’t done much in the league.

That might explain why we see Goff misfire on throws despite not being under pressure, like he did here against the Air Force:

It might also explain why his arm strength waivers on him from time to time, like we see on this flea-flicker attempt against USC:

That ball just dies on him after about 15 yards, forcing the receiver to drop to the ground to make the catch.

The larger the hand, the easier it is to grip the football, which in turn makes it easier to consistently deliver the ball with accuracy and power. I can’t say for sure that this is why Goff has a tendency to be off target or have passes die on him, but I think it is a reasonable conclusion based on the evidence before me.

Misdiagnosing Cover-2/Ball Placement Issues

Two final issues that popped up in the tape: misdiagnosing Cover-2 schemes and issues with ball placement.

While Goff has been praised as a cerebral player, I have seen several examples where Goff simply misdiagnoses a Cover-2 scheme, leading to interceptions:

I am not overly concerned about this — at least not yet — because it is likely something that can be ironed out over the course of his career. But it happened enough in his tape to warrant inclusion in the report.

The last couple gifs are more examples of Goff struggling — at times — with his ball placement.

Take this 10 yard slant that Goff completed against Utah:

This is an easy throw and catch, and one that Goff should be able to hit the receiver in stride with ease. But watch how the receiver has to lean back to catch the ball.

This may seem like nitpicking, but in the NFL, quarterbacks need to be precise with their ball placement. Being off several inches can mean the difference between a touchdown and interception.

Here is a more obvious example: if Goff delivers this ball in-bounds, it’s a touchdown. Instead, it’s two yards out of bounds, his receiver doesn’t even have a chance to make a play:

Conclusion

So where does this leave us? Goff has all the tools in the world that you want in a franchise quarterback: good size, accurate arm, cerebral player, with functional mobility to boot. But Goff is not as consistent as some of the other elite quarterback prospects that have come along. Which is why I project that —  if things pan out right — Goff will likely sit in the top 7-15 range of quarterbacks. Think Matt Ryan, Joe Flacco, and Eli Manning.

So I wouldn’t mortgage the future to go get him at the top of the draft, but I would definitely target him from pick 5-10.

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Why Pinning the Eagles hopes on Drafting a Mid-Round Quarterback to Develop  Into a Future Starter is Fools Gold. 

Patrick Causey, on Twitter @pcausey3

There is a trendy argument floating around on #EaglesTwitter that goes something like this: the Eagles don’t need to use a high draft choice on a quarterback because they can just target one in later rounds and develop him into a future starter.

It’s easy to understand the allure of this argument, like a mouth seduced by a flame, many are tricked into believing this approach is valid when when they see the likes of Tom Brady (6th round), Russell Wilson (3rd round), and Tony Romo (undrafted) performing at high levels.

But this argument is the functional equivalent of planning your retirement based on winning the lottery. Ok, perhaps the odds are not that far fetched, but you get the idea. Because for every Brady, Wilson or Romo, there are literally hundreds of mid-to-late round quarterbacks that don’t even play a single snap in the NFL.

In other words, planning to get your franchise quarterback after the first round is the rare exception to the rule: a generational lucky roll of the dice that cannot be relied upon with any degree of certainty.

To figure out just how improbable this is, I relied on three data sets: one that I compiled, one compiled by the venerable FootballOutsiders.com, and one from NumberFire.com, an analytically inclined website known more for its fantasy advice.

To pacify my ego, let’s start with the simple data sets that I compiled: Super Bowl appearances and best single seasons based on Pro-Football-Reference.com’s approximate value metric.

Super Bowl Appearances By Round

Using Super Bowl appearances, we can determine which round is most likely to produce Super Bowl quarterbacks. Obviously, this isn’t a perfect statistic: Super Bowl winning teams are more than a byproduct of quarterback play. But it is a telling stat nonetheless.

Starting in 1990, here are the quarterbacks that have played in the Super Bowl and the round in which each quarterback was drafted:

• 1st: 28 (54%) (!)
• 2nd: 4 (7%)
• 3rd: 4 (7%)
• 4th: 1 (2%)
• 5th: 0 (0%)
• 6th: 9 (17%)
• 7th: 0 (0%)
• Undrafted: 4 (7%)

• 1st round: 1724-1614-5 (.516)
• 2nd round: 440-413 (.516)
• 3rd round: 196-246-1 (.44)
• 4th round: 157-224-1 (.412)
• 5th round: 33-60 (.355)
• 6th round: 317-266 (.544)
• 7th round: 124-195-2 (.389)

Again, we see a sharp decline after the first two rounds, lending credence to the idea that drafting a quarterback is a certifiable crapshoot after the second round. Heck, it’s even a crapshoot drafting quarterbacks in the first two rounds, but I digress.

And we see a spike in the 6th round, which — yet again — we can easily explain with two words, (say it with me): Tom Brady.

And before we get too excited about finding the next Tom Brady, consider this: 86 quarterbacks were drafted in rounds six and seven. 43.0 percent (37) of the quarterbacks have played zero games. So for every one Tom Brady you find, 37 more don’t even play a single snap.

Playoff Success:

Different metric, largely the same result. Quarterbacks drafted in the first two rounds were much more likely to have success in the playoffs than their counterparts taken in rounds three through seven:

In other words, every quarterback drafted in the first two rounds produced, on averaged, 2.83 playoff starts, compared to .69 for quarterbacks drafted in rounds three through seven. The win totals were equally disparate, with the top rounds producing an average of 1.38 wins per quarterback drafted, compared to .30 for the later rounds.

And those latter statistics were inflated by the presence of — you guessed it — Tom Brady. If we removed him from the equation, the numbers are even less inspiring: .54 starts per quarterback and .16 wins per quarterback, respectively.

Weighted DVOA By Round:

FootballOutsiders.com also compiled a list of the top rated single seasons based on its advanced metric, DVOA. While there are slight differences with PFR’s approximate value ranking highlighted above, the end result is still the same: first round quarterbacks dominate:

Conclusion

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Sam Bradford improved considerably down the stretch, but key statistics suggest he might not be the Eagles long-term solution.

Patrick Causey, on Twitter @pcausey3

A quick note before we start: We are at the end of a three part series analyzing the Eagles head coach (read here), front office (read here) and now, quarterback. A special thanks to David Menard, who helped me with the Chip Kelly statistical comparisons in this piece. Give him a follow on Twitter @heyyou_ca.

The Eagles are at a crossroads right now, starring square in the face of a franchise altering decision that could have far reaching implications for the next half decade. What should the Eagles do with soon-to-be free agent quarterback Sam Bradford?

Debating the Eagles quarterback position has become an offseason tradition of sorts since Donovan McNabb was traded. It provides the perfect opportunity to pass the time between the end of another disappointing season and the eternal optimism that comes with the summer, when we somehow talk ourselves — yet again — into believing that “this year will finally be our year.”

The options facing the Eagles are simple: they can sign Bradford to a long term deal, let Bradford walk and fill the quarterback void via the draft and/or free agency, or use the franchise tag to evaluate Bradford for another year or trade him to a quarterback needy team.

The one option that can easily be dismissed is releasing Bradford outright. The NFL is starving for quarterbacks and Bradford showed enough promise down the stretch that, at a minimum, the Eagles should be able to trade him for a valuable draft pick (how valuable remains to be seen).

But choosing between the remaining options — signing Bradford long term or franchising him — is anything but simple. So I broke this down by using an easy decision making matrix: look at the positives, look at the negatives, and then come to a solution (profound stuff, I know).

When viewed through this prism, a clearer picture starts to emerge. Bradford undoubtedly has positives working in his favor: he has all the tools of a franchise caliber quarterback, tools that have tantalized scouts, coaches and football executives since he burst onto the scene during his Heismann trophy campaign at Oklahoma. We saw glimpses of those tools, first during training camp and the preseason, and then at the tail end of the 2015 season when he finally started to look like the quarterback we had all hoped he would become.

But sandwiched in the middle of those strong performances was a reminder why Bradford was traded by the Rams in the first place: his sporadic accuracy, faulty mechanics, and refusal to attack defenses deep were significant impediments to the Eagles offense. And when we take a step back and analyze not just the 2015 season, but Bradford’s entire career, the scales start to tip decidedly in favor of franchising Bradford instead. Indeed, we would be foolish to ignore the risk of relying on such a small sample size of good games from Bradford when making our decision. We would be remiss to ignore the impact that playing in Chip Kelly’s quarterback friendly offense had on Bradford’s strong play. We would be wise to recognize the limitation that Bradford’s risk adverse approach to playing quarterback (i.e., refusing to attack defenses deep) has on the Eagles ability to score points. And we must remember that any long term deal risks coinciding with Bradford suffering another significant injury.

Let’s break this down further.

In Support of Bradford

Bradford’s Improvement Over The Course Of The 2015 Season

If we look at Bradford’s season as a whole, his mediocre numbers largely mirror his mediocre career, leading to the inevitable conclusion that Bradford is nothing more than a mediocre quarterback.

But, as is often the case, extenuating circumstances exist which require us to take Bradford’s 2015 numbers with a grain of salt. Bradford came off a two-year layoff thanks to consecutive ACL tears, missed significant time in training camp thanks to rehab, and had to learn a new offense and develop chemistry with new teammates. So as I said back in training camp, some growing pains were to be expected.

And as we saw, Bradford’s play improved as the season progressed, which suggests that he was indeed rusty. If we break Bradford’s season down into halves, that improvement becomes apparent (Bradford’s rank among qualifying quarterbacks are in parentheses):

The two areas where he either maintained or regressed in rankings — total yards and touchdowns — were likely the byproduct of Bradford missing 2 1/2 games more than an issue with his play.

Still, those numbers aren’t overwhelming. At best, these numbers show that Bradford went from one of the worst quarterbacks in the league to middle of the pack.

But what if we limit our focus to the last five weeks of the season, after Bradford came back from injury? That was, without question, Bradford’s best stretch of the season:

These numbers are something worth considering. As I’ve laid out before, history suggests that on average, you need at least a quarterback that ranks in the top 13 of DVOA and DYAR to realistically compete for a Super Bowl. If Bradford could replicate these numbers for the entire season, he would certainly be within striking range of that baseline production.

We can also see Bradford’s improvement over the course of the season by comparing each game he played to how the rest of the NFL has performed against that defense. On the left, you see the averages for each defense that Bradford faced on the year. On the right are Bradford’s stats for each particular game. The numbers highlighted in green are the areas in which Bradford outperformed the defense’s average, the numbers in red are where Bradford under-performed.

You will notice a lot of red in the early part of the year, but  see that the green starts to predominate as we get down the stretch.

Averages                                                                Bradford

These statistics lend credence to what many of his supporters have been saying: Bradford struggled early on because of his time off from the game and his adjustment to a new offense. But once he became comfortable, Bradford’s play started to improve.

And to an extent, that theory is backed up by the tape as well. I brokedown the tape on Bradford four times this year (which you can read here, here, here and here). I can’t rehash all of it, but I do want to briefly cover some of the areas where we saw Bradford’s play improve the most: accuracy, throwing under pressure, and manipulating the defense.

Accuracy

Per PFF.com, Bradford ranked 11th in completion percentage on the year, completing 65% of his passes. But if we account for drops — which were an issue all season long for the Eagles — Bradford was the fourth most accurate passer in the league, with a 78.1 accuracy percentage according to PFF.com.

But accuracy goes beyond just completion and accuracy percentages. Ball placement is critical in the NFL. It requires quarterbacks to fit a ball through impossibly tight windows with regularity. That repetitive accuracy is what separates the good quarterbacks from the great ones, the latter of whom are able to carve through a defense with surgeon like precision to move the ball down the field.

Bradford struggled mightily with his accuracy early in the year, something which I attributed mainly to his faulty mechanics. But as the season progressed, Bradford’s accuracy started to improve. Whether it was building more confidence in his knee or thinking less on the field (or both), we started to see the pinpoint accuracy that was so often discussed during training camp:

Throwing Under Pressure

When the Eagles acquired Bradford, I was concerned with his inability to perform well under pressure. As this chart shows, Bradford was one of the worst passers in football when facing pressure in St. Louis:

About halfway through the year, Bradford was still struggling, completing only 44.6% of his passes under pressure, which ranked 26 out of 31 qualifying quarterbacks. His 4 touchdowns and interceptions also ranked 2nd and 3rd worst in the league.

But Bradford improved considerably as the season progressed and ultimately finished the season as PFF.com’s top passer under pressure. While you can (and arguably should) quibble with PFF’s ranking system, his numbers were still impressive: he completed 56.6% of his passes (4th best), had a league high 74.6% accuracy percentage, and threw the 9th most touchdown passes in the league.

Go back and watch the Arizona Cardinals game; it was an absolute clinic on how to deliver passes under pressure:

Manipulating the Defense

There are certain things that separate the best quarterbacks in the league from the mediocre ones. Repetitive accuracy, smart decision making, and manipulating the defense are near the top of that list. While Kelly prevented Bradford from making adjustments at the line of scrimmage presnap, Bradford was still able to show off the cerebral part of his game on occasion.

I’ve covered this play before, but it is the quintessential example of how a quarterback can outsmart a defense:

The player whose ankles Bradford just broke with his eyes is Carolina’s All Pro linebacker Luke Kuechly. Bradford deftly manipulated Kuechly to open up the middle of the field for Jordan Matthews.

We didn’t see this from Bradford with any sense of regularity until the second half of the season. But it was an encouraging sign nonetheless, providing hope that Bradford could build off this next year.

All good things right? Let me channel my inner-Lee Corso for a moment: Not so fast my friends.

For starters, Bradford’s improvement occurred over a small sample size of five games. And as we have seen in the past, putting too much stock in good production over a short period of time is fraught with risk. (Remember Nick Foles?)

We would also need to consider two other factors that suggest Bradford is not the long-term solution: whether Chip Kelly’s offense has artificially inflated Bradford’s stats and how much value Bradford actually contributed to the Eagles.

(Note: this article was split up into separate pages due to its size. Please click on 2 to continue)