Week 17: Eagles vs. Giants Rewind

Two notes before we get to it:

1) There was almost nothing positive to take from that game.  On review, it was as bad as it seemed live (maybe even worse since the lack of effort was abundantly clear when each player was viewed individually.)

2) There weren’t many players of interest for the team’s future due to injuries.

In light of that, here are the Rewind thoughts, followed by some pictures:

– Anyone who watched Vick on Sunday should have a newfound appreciation for Nick Foles.  There are few things as annoying for a football fan than to watch the QB repeatedly miss open receivers.  The super-athletic “mobile” QB’s can have their speed, I’ll take accuracy over running any day.

LeSean McCoy is crazy good.  The lone bright spot this week, McCoy might have single-handedly made the Eagles head coaching job the most attractive available.  I have mixed feelings on Chip Kelly, but there’s no doubt that he must be salivating at the prospect of having McCoy/Brown as his backfield.

As far as turnaround plans go, the Eagles is fairly simple:  Let McCoy carry the offense behind a healthy line while you fix the defense and get a longer look at Foles.

– I mentioned that Graham would be a focus while reviewing the tape, so…he played an OK game.  Wasn’t nearly as disruptive as he has been over the past few weeks, but the Giants are among the toughest match-ups in the league for pass rushers.  Graham made a few nice plays and repeatedly drove his blocker backwards, but couldn’t get off the block to finish the job.  However, given the fact that everyone else on the defense either mailed it in or didn’t have the talent to be on the field in the first place, it’s probably not a game to draw anything significant from.

– The LBs for the Eagles had an absolutely embarrassing performance.  I’d prefer not to mention their names in the hope that they will just disappear from both the roster and my memory.  Demeco and Mychael can come back, everyone else needs to go.   Complete lack of ability.

Now the illustrations:

Hand-off to nobody – One of the most frustrating aspects of the Vick era can be seen below.  Most readers here will recognize it, since we’ve seen it much more often than anyone should.  Vick either fakes the hand-off with nobody in the backfield, or does it to the side opposite the runner.

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Running PA when you’re not a running team is problematic enough, but doing it without even having a RB to fake-accept the hand-off is downright obnoxious.  Normally I’d chalk this up to a miscommunication, but it’s happened often enough that simple miscommunication seems unlikely.  Additionally, though I haven’t gone back and checked, I don’t recall seeing this from Foles, which indicates it’s not by design.  Needless to say, I’m stumped.  Regardless, with Vick gone, let’s hope we never see it again.

Dear Colt, thanks for playing, better luck next career.

Though there were lots of plays that highlighted the myriad defensive holes of the Eagles, this one is particularly galling because of the situation.  The team is already losing 28-7.  There are just 10 seconds left in the half and the Giants are already in field goal range.  That means this is a pretty straightforward play for the defense:  KEEP THEM OUT OF THE END ZONE.  The Giants have 3 TOs, but with only 10 seconds remaining, they likely only have two plays left, this one and a field goal attempt.

The Eagles recognize the situation and line up accordingly in a quarters-zone prevent defense.  That means the two safeties and outside corners essentially split the field into four slices, with each of them responsible for one.   Meanwhile, the two LBs and Boykin (slot corner) each have an underneath zone.  The goal of the play is not necessarily to prevent a completion, it’s simply to force the Giants to complete a ball in bounds and tackle them in play, eliminating a TD as a possibility and forcing a field goal.  The DTs run a twist, but it doesn’t produce much pressure.

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With the above picture and situation in mind, lets jump to later in the play:

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This is the moment of the catch and the only correct response is either What?!? or various profanities strung together.  To recap, the Eagles’ only goal on this play was to prevent a receiver from getting behind them for a TD.  Not only does that happen, but Colt Anderson manages to wind up nearly 5 yards under his man at the catch!

So how did it happen?  Colt Anderson had a brain-cramp.

If you look back at the initial diagram, Cruz runs a seem, but stutter-steps twice.  His second stutter-step occurs just in front of Colt and causes Anderson to freeze.  The only thing Anderson CAN NOT do in this situation is stop moving and let Cruz behind him, so of course that’s exactly what he does.  Here is Colt’s freeze:

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An absolute disaster of a play for Colt and the Eagles, though it obviously wouldn’t have changed the outcome.  Even if Anderson gets thrown by the stutter-step, he absolutely MUST maintain his momentum moving backwards.  That way, even if he guesses wrong on which direction Cruz is going, he has a chance to recover.  Instead, he stands still, while Cruz is still near full-speed.  The chances of Colt catching Cruz after giving him a head start?  Absolutely none.  We knew Anderson didn’t have the speed to run with fast receivers, but we’ve also learned that he doesn’t know how to compensate for it.

The Wheel Route strikes again.

This play is from earlier in the game, when the outcome was still technically in doubt.  The Giants are up 14-0 with 3:26 left to go in the 1st quarter.  3rd down with 4 yards to go.   The result of the play is a 41 yard completion to Bradshaw out of the backfield.  Here is the pre-snap setup:

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Nothing too crazy going on, though there is one big note to make.  See Colt Anderson’s assignment (safety to the bottom of the screen)?  Immediately after the snap, Colt moves to double-team the slot receiver.  Not sure exactly what Todd Bowles saw to make him call this up, but regardless, it results in a huge hole that the Giants end up exploiting.  UPDATE: To clarify: this looks a bit like robber coverage with Colt playing an underneath zone.  However, at the snap Anderson moves full speed at the slot WR with no regard to his route.  Therefore, it seems more like a double-team than a zone read that Anderson saw and reacted to.

Below is the key moment of the play.  Say what you want about Eli Manning, but the guy is very good at manipulating defenses, especially with the pump-fake.  Here, he uses it perfectly to shift Demeco Ryan’s coverage angle, resulting in the separation he needs to get the ball over top to Bradshaw.  I’ve highlighted Demeco’s angle as he falls for the pump-fake and attacks where he thinks the ball is going.  Also highlighted is Colt Anderson and the space he vacated, resulting in a huge window for Manning to deliver the ball.

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And finally, below, we see Bradshaw as he gets behind Ryans.

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The Wheel Route is one the Giants have used with great effect against the Eagles over the past few years.  The key is that it forces a LB into coverage, where they are typically uncomfortable, and then increases the pressure on said LB through the pump-fake.  The fakes are hard enough for CBs to resist, but even more difficult for LBs purely because they aren’t in coverage as often.  Normally, the safety would provide deep help and ideally break up the play, but Colt left for the double-team, resulting in a very tough matchup for Demeco and 41 yards for the Giants. This particular play is not an indictment of Colt.  It appeared as though the double-team was 100% by design.

Also of note: Kurt Coleman (the deep safety) misses a tackle on Bradshaw after the reception and DRC makes the tackle after chasing the play from more than 15 yards back.

End of the Rewinds

That’s the end of the Eagles Game Rewinds for this year.  However, I’ll probably diagram a few big plays from the playoff games.

Meanwhile, we’ll shift to a roster evaluation and see what the weaknesses are heading into the offseason before an in-depth dive into draft history to see how much is luck vs. skill.

More on Post-4 Win Success

Regarding yesterday’s post, two of the 10+ win teams following a 4 win season were under new coaches:

NY Jets ’06 – Eric Mangini was hired and led the team to 10 wins.  However, his tenure thereafter was mixed and I don’t think any Eagles fan wants a similar experience.

Atlanta ’08 – The team won 11 games in Mike Smith’s first year.  Also Matt Ryan’s rookie year.  This is really the gold standard for 4 win turnarounds.

Other notable new-coach turnarounds:

Miami ’08 – Biggest turnaround in NFL history, improved from 1-15 to 11-5.  Tony Sparano’s first year, as well as Bill Parcells’ first year leading the front office.

Saints ’06 – Team hired Sean Payton and Drew Brees, improving to 10 wins from just 3 the previous season.

Colts ’12 – Obviously Andrew Luck’s rookie year, team improved from 2 wins to 11.  Also Chuck Pagano’s first season as coach, though that was complicated by his cancer treatments.

 

Hope for next year?

The Eagles finished the year with 4 wins.  Everyone’s heard plenty of talk over the last few seasons of parity in the NFL, but what kind of season could the Eagles put together following such a bad year?

Over the past 10 seasons, 27 teams have finished the year with 4 wins (not including this year.)

The good news?

Ten of them (more than 1/3) have followed a 4 win season with 9+ wins, with six teams registering 10 wins or better.

Here is the frequency chart:

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Quick rebounds not only happen, they do so relatively often.  The coaching decision is obviously huge, but regardless, given the injuries this team sustained and the past performance of 4 win teams, seen in the chart above, it’s not unreasonable to expect the Eagles to contend for a playoff position as soon as next year.

“Pass to score TDs, run to kick field goals”…or not

With the current emphasis on the passing game in the NFL, the adage “throw to score TDs, run to kick field goals” has become popular with commentators.

Is it true?

To get an idea, I looked at the passing play percentage and points scored for every team in the league going back to 2003, giving me 320 data points.  Here is the chart, with passing play percentage on the X and points scored on the Y:

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See a relationship?

If you said no, you’d be correct.  The correlation value for the above data series is -.083, which means there is really no relationship.  Passing the ball more often does not appear to lead to more points scored.

Some of you (if not everyone) are probably thinking:  “Wait, teams change their play-calling when the are winning/losing, skewing the run/pass ratio.”  My answer: Of course they do, but that itself should not skew the above data to such a degree that there is NO relationship between passing percentage and points scored (if passing really did lead to more points scored.)  Teams that noticeably change their strategy can only do-so late in the game, limiting the number of plays they can run that will skew their overall averages.  Additionally, teams that are running the ball to kill the clock take as much time as possible, running as few plays as possible, again limiting the skew.  Overall, of all the plays run in the NFL every year, relatively few of them are run by teams focused on anything except scoring points.

Feel free to disagree, but if passing the ball more really did lead to more points scored (i.e. TDs instead of field goals), I’d expect to see at least a weak-moderate positive relationship despite any skew effects of teams killing the clock.

Conversely, we can also ask: “Do teams pass more when they are losing?” While the data can’t tell us definitively which is cause and which is effect (do losing teams throw more or does throwing lead to more points against?), it can show us if there is a relationship between the two. Here is the chart, this time with Points Allowed on the Y axis:

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A fairly clear positive relationship exists.  In fact, the correlation value of .46 confirms there is a moderate positive relationship between Passing Play Percentage and Points Allowed.

Let me note again that the data doesn’t prove “Losing teams throw more often”, but it does lend pretty strong support to that hypothesis.  However, given the data above, perhaps losing teams should consider running the ball more, since passing it doesn’t appear to give them a greater chance of catching up (scoring points.)

Obviously this doesn’t hold for end of game scenarios where the clock becomes a big factor (passing takes less time then running.)  However, it does suggest that teams that fall behind early shouldn’t alter their game plan until it is absolutely necessary (very late in the game), something Andy Reid repeatedly did over his career with the Eagles.

Andy Reid Playcalling

Andy Reid’s play-calling has been a favorite topic of discussion for fans since he was hired.  Now that he’s gone, let’s take a look back at he run/pass ratio.  I’m compiling a lot of data for a more in-depth look (and one we’ll be able to draw statistically significant conclusions from), but for now, here is a basic view of the percentage of passing plays called by the Eagles:

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Notes: The data is from teamrankings.com and only goes back to 2003.  The averages are not weighted by number of plays, in hopes of giving a better view of differences in general offensive philosophy.

Over that time period (2003-2012):

– The Eagles average annual passing rate was 59.90%, behind only 4 other teams (Arizona, Detroit, New Orleans, St. Louis).

– Detroit passed the most, by far, with an average rate of 62.84%.

– The Steelers had the lowest average rate, passing 52.47% of the time.

– The highest single year rate was registered by Detroit in 2006, when the Lions passed on 68.43% of plays.  They went 3-13 that year.

– The lowest single year rate came from the Steelers in 2004, when the team passed on just 39.20% of plays.  That year the team went 15-1 (Big Ben’s rookie year).

Next up, we’ll tackle the obvious question:  Does passing more equal winning more? More points scored?  Putting the data together now.  I hope to have an answer in the next day or so.