Short Post. Odds and Ends

Very short one today, just getting a few things out of the way.

First, here is a very good article from Bill Barnwell on Grantland about the NFL draft.  If you enjoy the work I’ve done here then Barnwell’s piece will make a lot of sense to you.

Second, I added a graph for the TE position:Screen Shot 2013-04-23 at 11.09.31 AM

Few true high-end talents here, and I don’t expect the Eagles to take one with their first two picks.  Travis Kelce has been mentioned a lot as a potential 3rd rounder for the Birds and I think that looks to be about right.  Given Kelly’s purported love of TEs though, this is definitely a potential source for a draft-day(s) surprise (something like Ertz or Escobar in the 2nd).

Lastly, I’ve reordered the top 20 prospect chart I presented on Friday.  Now it matches the format of the positional groups, so that prospect are sorted by “high” value rather than average rating.  Here is the updated chart:Screen Shot 2013-04-23 at 2.06.06 PM

Notice the scale on the left.  All of these prospects are graded very similarly.  Taking “risk” into account, it appears as though the “top tier” is 9 guys deep, ending with Mingo and before Ogletree.  With this in mind, the Cardinals at #7 and the Jets at #9 are the best potential trade down partners for the Eagles.  The team can pick up an extra pick (potentially a high 2nd rounder) and still select a “top tier” prospect, though Mingo is actually the only guy in that group I really DON’T want.

That’s all.  I told you it’d be short (and this time I meant it).

Mega-post: Visual Positional Rankings and Flawed Draft Logic

My goal for today was to apply the same type of analysis I posted on Friday to each major position group, illustrating the prospects tiers in each one.  I have, indeed, done that and will post it below.  However, I also feel compelled to address an article I saw today on Philly.com by Phil Sheridan; so you’re actually getting two posts in one.  If you don’t care about the Sheridan piece, please scroll past it and go right to the positional breakdown, since it’s among the most important draft posts that I’ve done.

The Article

Here it is. In general, I have no problem with Sheridan and don’t mean to pick on someone simply voicing their opinion.  With this article, though, Sheridan PERFECTLY encapsulates the type of conventional “fan-think” and flawed draft strategy that I hate.

The column is titled “Eagles better off keeping the fourth overall pick”.  Now the title itself is not an issue, since there are definitely reasons to keep the pick.  The reasoning, however, is unfortunate.

“With their highest pick since taking Donovan McNabb No. 2 overall in 1999, the Eagles need an impact player. If new head coach Chip Kelly is going to build a championship team, he is going to need some championship players. The fourth pick of this draft is the best place to start.”

The Eagles need an impact player (a few in fact); I couldn’t agree more.  It’s important to note, though, that NEEDING something does not have any effect on it being available.

“If Roseman and his revamped staff can’t identify a Pro Bowl-caliber player from the hundreds available this week, the Eagles have a bigger problem than a single draft bust.”

This is perhaps the worst line of all, and it seems to exemplify what a lot of others are thinking.  The logic goes:

Howie’s job is to evaluate players (with his FO team).  If he can’t accurately identify an “elite” player at #4, he’s not doing his job and therefore doesn’t deserve it.

The flaw in this logic?  What if there aren’t any pro-bowlers in the draft?  It’s unlikely, and I don’t believe that’s the case this year, but it’s possible.  Again, simply wishing for an elite player does not make him appear.  More importantly, what if there are SEVERAL pro-bowl caliber players available at #4?

Here, Sheridan seems to completely ignore the notion of VALUE, which is, of course, the key to the entire draft process.  In essence, you want to get players you LOVE at the LOWEST POSSIBLE PICK.  Focusing on the first part (players you love) and forgetting the second part is a recipe for disaster (I’ll get to that in a second).

“The Eagles haven’t drafted a defensive Pro Bowler since Trent Cole in 2005. Fletcher Cox, Mychal Kendrick, and Brandon Graham may get there, but their chances will be increased exponentially by adding a great player to the mix.” (I added the bold emphasis.)

I’ll just leave that one for you and move on.

“The experts would have torn their meticulously styled hair out if someone had taken Colin Kaepernick or Russell Wilson with the fourth pick of their respective drafts. But those picks would have looked visionary right now.”

WRONG.

First, the fact that each player lasted so long means taking them in the first round, let alone with the #4 overall pick, would have been TERRIBLE VALUE.

Seattle chose Wilson with the 75th overall pick (their 3rd rounder).  In the first round, the team selected Bruce Irvin, and while that was a “reach” at the time, Irvin went on to collect 8 sacks last season.  With their 2nd round pick, the Seahawks selected Bobby Wagner (MLB).  All he did as a rookie was collect 140 tackles, 2 sacks, and 3 interceptions.  ProFootball Focus rated Wagner as the 2nd best inside linebacker in the entire league last year.

So let’s recap:  In hindsight, Seattle could have chosen Russell Wilson with the 15th overall pick and been relatively happy with that selection.  However, they would have given up Bruce Irvin and his 8 sacks as a rookie.  OR, the team could have selected Wilson with the 47th overall pick and been very happy with that selection.  However, they would have given up Bobby Wagner, one of the best young linebackers in the game.

In reality, the Seahawks chose Wilson in the third round, and is ECSTATIC, since the team was able to use its earlier picks on two potential building blocks for the defense.

Safe to say Seattle likes the way that turned out.

There’s a relatively pervasive strand of draft reasoning that says: “be confident in your board and take the guys you love, regardless of where that is.”  Sheridan seems to be advocating that here with his “visionary” comment and when he later says “Target your guy and make a bold move to get him.”  Those types of picks let you pat yourself on the back and feel good about “getting your guy”, but often end in disaster.

This is what happens when you ignore value:

Tyson Alualu, Tim Tebow, Darius Heyward-Bey, Matt Jones, etc…

Yes, there are a few cases that worked out, but they’re heavily outnumbered by the legends you see represented above.

Sorry, Phil, you’re way off.

 

Positional Breakdown

Now back to the prospects.  If you haven’t yet read Friday’s post, please do so, since it’s the basis for what I’m showing you today.  To recap, I’ve taken the three major scouting ratings (Scouts Inc., NFP, and NFL.com) and averaged them together to get a consensus score for each player.  I then calculated the standard deviation for each player and used that to create a corresponding value range (+- 1 SD).  Overall, I believe this provides a much more informative “draft board” than simply listing prospects sequentially.  While every team assigns each player a specific grade, they must also recognize that certain players have a better chance of reaching those grades than others.  These charts are an attempt to quantify and visualize that logic.

Two notes before I get to the charts: On friday I sorted each graph by average rating. I’ve changed that and am now sorting by the Upside score.  The theory here is that when a player is drafted, it’s likely to be by a team that has a relatively high grade on him.  Therefore, sorting by “high” should provide a better prediction of actual draft order.  Second, ESPN has some conflicting ratings depending on which page you load. I’ve updated a few of the ratings based on noticed differences, so you may see a few small changes in player ratings/ranges from Friday’s post.

Lets start with the CBs:Screen Shot 2013-04-22 at 11.25.08 AM

We can see why Dee Milliner is the consensus #1 CB.  He’s clearly in his own tier, with both a higher expected value than anyone else and a lower range (less uncertainty).  After him, the guy to pay attention to is DJ Hayden, who seems to be rising up draft boards.  Mike Mayock actually has him ranked above Dee Milliner.  This chart shows that Hayden does indeed have the talent to become one of the best CBs in this class.  However, it also shows that he carries a lot of risk as well.  For my money, I’d rather have Jamar Taylor or Xavier Rhodes.  Giving up very little upside for A LOT less downside.

Now DEs:Screen Shot 2013-04-22 at 11.29.13 AM

Note that the DE/OLB breakdown is difficult since there are several players who could go either way (Mingo for example could definitely be an OLB).  I’ve defaulted to whichever position a player is listed as by ESPN.

Here we can see that the top tier of DEs is composed of 3 players, Ansah, Mingo, and Werner, with little difference between them and a big drop-off after them.  Tank Carradine sticks out as the best option after the first tier, but he carries some injury risk that isn’t represented here.

OLBs:

Screen Shot 2013-04-22 at 11.32.51 AM

 

Similar to the CBs, we see a clear top tier of just one prospect (Dion Jordan).  The talent falls off relatively quickly after Jordan, which is something to keep an eye on in the draft.  If the Eagles really want an OLB, it might be best to take Jordan (if he’s there) at #4, since the options after him are lacking.

DTs:

Screen Shot 2013-04-22 at 11.35.34 AM

 

I’m a big fan of Star Lotulelei; I think his versatility and skill-set make him a great fit for the Eagles.  However, this chart is a pretty clear case for NOT taking him at #4.  The drop-off in DT talent is not nearly as severe as we saw in the OLBs or CBs, suggesting the team could slide down or wait until round 2 and still grab a DT with a lot of talent.  Five players here have “upsides” that crack 90, illustrating the very strong depth of this DT class.

The OTs:

Screen Shot 2013-04-22 at 11.39.06 AM

 

The chart confirms Joeckel and Fisher as perhaps the best players in the draft (on an absolute basis).  However, it also shows that there is reasonable depth behind them at the OT position.  I’ve mentioned him a few times, but Menelik Watson looks like he’ll be a great value at the end of the first round or beginning of the second.  He doesn’t crack the 90 point mark, but the scouts are very confident that he’ll be a good (not great) player.

The QBs:

Screen Shot 2013-04-22 at 11.43.18 AM

 

This is a particularly informative chart, as it clearly shows the risk associated with each QB.  Nassib is clearly the boom/bust player of the class, though EJ Manuel also carries in incredibly large range of potential values.  Tyler WIlson is the “least risky” QB, in that he offers the narrowest range, but he also does not show the potential upside that most teams are looking for in a starting QB.

Some team will take the plunge on Nassib and Manuel, but I wouldn’t touch them in the 1st round with a ten-foot pole.  Even at #35 overall, I’d probably pass.

The Safeties:

Screen Shot 2013-04-22 at 11.47.25 AM

 

This is a position of interest for Eagles fans, since the team is in desperate need of some talent at safety.  This is, potentially, a very deep class.  Notice, though, that many of the players carry a LOT of uncertainty.  At this moment, my only concrete “want” for the draft is for the Eagles to come out of it with one of the top guys here.  Cyprien would be my choice, and I think it’s possible the Eagles trade up into the end of the 1st round to get him.  The team could wait on either Elam or Swearinger, but each is a risky play.  Conversely, the team could almost definitely sit at #35 and select Eric Reid, but he doesn’t offer the potential upside I (and most fans) would like to see with that valuable a draft pick.

Lastly, the WRs:

Screen Shot 2013-04-22 at 11.51.57 AM

 

Not much to say here, other than there aren’t any clear gaps in the group.  That means if you want a receiver, you’ll be able to find one almost anywhere in the first three rounds without “reaching”.  Not a lot of high-level talent (only 3 players break 90, and one just barely), but lots of solid prospects.

That’s all folks. Congratulations and thank you to whomever stuck with this post for all 1800+words.  I’m going to post the positional charts separately under their own page, similar to what I’ve done with the PVM rankings.  That way you can easily refer to them during and after the draft.

The Right Way to Format a Draft Board

Less than a week until the draft begins, and it’s clear that nobody has any clue what’s going to happen at the top of the board (aside from Joeckel, who seems like a decent bet to go #1).  Although it’s fun reading supposed “intelligence”, most of its useless and will bear no resemblance to what the reality will be, so don’t get too worked up over things like “sources say the Eagles really like Geno Smith”.

Also, the full NFL schedule was released yesterday.  Go have a look if you’re interested. Personally, I don’t think it’s worth that much attention at this stage of the off-season, though playing the Redskins week 1 is nice (likely before RG3 is up to speed).

So what to talk about?

Well over the past few weeks I’ve advanced a number of different ways to view/think about the NFL draft.  Today I think I’ve got the clearest illustration yet of what I believe is the “best” way to look at a draft board.

The general idea is that assigning prospects exact values on a 0-100 scale (or any other scale) is ridiculous.  It’s foolish to think that any scout or group of scouts can accurately grade NFL prospects with such precision.  Conversely, the other method of ranking prospects seems to be a non-numerical hierarchy.  That too is useless.  It’s not enough to know that Player A is ranked above Player B.

We need to know how big of a gap there is!  Otherwise, we have no concept of true value as we go through the draft.

So what can we do better?

We can, rather than assigning specific values, look at VALUE RANGES.  Below, I’ve included a few charts that depict the top 20 prospects and assigns each a range of expected values.  To come up with the ranges, I simply took the average ratings of NFP, ESPN, and NFL.com (our Consensus Ratings from the TPR system) then used the standard deviation for each prospect to create the range (+- 1 SD).

A few notes:  I wish we had a lot more data (ratings).  This does not make any adjustment for positional value, it is strictly a depiction of each prospects individual ratings.  In practice, each team would incorporate their own rankings and adjust for things like positional value, player personality, fit, etc…

Now let’s look at the charts:

Screen Shot 2013-04-19 at 9.48.20 AMAbove are the top 11 prospects (by average rating).  As we can clearly see, according to our data, some of these players carry much wider potential ranges than others.  There is no “correct” way to read this graph, it all depends on your personal preference.

For example, if we are just looking for “impact” than we would focus on the HIGH end of the ranges.  Doing this, we can see that Sharrif Floyd may turn out to be the best player in the draft outside of Luke Joeckel, despite the fact that he’s ranked just 7th overall.

Or, if we are risk averse, we can see exactly why Chance Warmack is such an interesting prospect.  Despite playing a positional of relatively little importance, he’s clearly the “least risky” prospect, whose “downside” appears to still be extremely good.

Regardless of what your preference or risk tolerance is, it’s should be pretty clear that a discrete ranking or prospects (i.e. a “big board”) is of little practical value.  It’s vital to get a sense of both the potential downside and upside of each prospect, and to EXAMINE THE OVERLAPS.

Dion Jordan and Eric Fisher carry almost identical consensus ratings, but Fisher has a wider range of potential values.  Is Fisher’s downside trade-off worth his upside potential?  Or would you rather take Jordan, who carries a narrower range of values (but necessarily gives up some upside)?

Here are prospects 12-20:
Screen Shot 2013-04-19 at 9.55.36 AM

By average rating, Cordarrelle Patterson is rated higher than Tyler Eifert, but it’s pretty clear you can make the case for Eifert being the better prospect.

Finally, here is a chart of all 20 prospects shown together.  I split them up above to make it easier to see.

Screen Shot 2013-04-19 at 9.52.24 AM

If I can convince you of just one thing going into the draft, it’s this.  False precision is incredibly detrimental to value in the NFL draft.  Let’s say you are agnostic as far as positional need, would you rather take Dion Jordan at #4 or slide down and take Star Lotulelei a bit later (assuming you own board looks like the one above).  The “value” in that situation is pretty clearly on the side of moving down.

Putting a hierarchical ranking together and just selecting the best available is a very poor way to derive value in the draft.

Is Trading Down a “Free Lunch”?

While it seems like many people are coming around to the idea that the Eagles should trade down, I figured I’d provide an exercise that illustrates why trading down (but not too far!) is the best option.

First, remember that I previously posted the historical success rates for picks 1-5, 6-10, and 11-15, finding very little difference in the odds (though there are definitely positional differences).  That itself is pretty good evidence for trading down if there is not a single high-quality prospect at a position of great need.

Now let’s play a probability game that will get us to the same place, albeit with a different route.

Suppose I placed three $1 bills and one $20 bill in a hat and asked you and three of your friends to take turns picking one bill (blindly).  The goal, of course, is to select the $20 bill.  Would you want to choose 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th?

The answer might be obvious for those of you familiar with probabilities, but I’m going to run through the math anyway:

1st Choice: 1 out of 4 chance; 25%

2nd Choice: 75% chance the $20 is still there, 1 of 3 chance you select it (75/3) or 25%

3rd Choice: 50% chance the $20 is still there, 1 of 2 chance you select it (50/2) or 25%

4th Choice: 25% chance the $20 is still there, if it is you get it, so 25%

So which turn would you want?  It doesn’t matter!  Your odds of getting the $20 are the same, regardless of whether you choose 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th.

However, I’m betting there’s almost nobody that (prior to reading) chose to pick 4th.

Why is that?

I don’t know, and it could be the result of a number of factors. Perhaps you all actually did choose to pick 4th and I’m way off base, but I really doubt that.  Maybe there is some “participation premium” by which having the opportunity to actually “pick” a bill is assigned a slightly higher value than just receiving whatever is left over.  Maybe we can get really existential and say that there’s something inside all of us that prefers to have some “control” (i.e. getting a choice of bills), even when it’s not real.

Regardless, the odds remain the same, and the reasoning doesn’t matter to us.

Applying it to the Draft

Obviously, the above game is not a perfect representation of the NFL draft.  There are multiple “$20s” in every draft, as well as a much wider selection of values in general.  Also, teams are not picking blind, they know which prospect they are selecting (which would ruin the game above).

However, in particular cases (this draft being one), I think the $20 game is a useful metaphor.  In the game, we know the values but are choosing blindly.  In the draft, we know who we are choosing but don’t know the true values.  While on the surface it’s a bit different, in reality the outcomes remain similar.

So at pick #4, let’s say the Eagles are choosing between Eric Fisher, Dee Milliner, Star Lotulelei, and Dion Jordan.

Which one is the “elite” player?  Is there more than one?  Are there none?  I’m sure everyone has an opinion, but how sure are you?  They’ve all received very similar scouting grades and ratings (when looking at a multiple sources).

Note: I’m ignoring positional differences here because all four of those players would fill a need for the Eagles.

I would argue that, while they are all likely to be good players, I have NO IDEA who will be the “best”.  I could take a guess and write a very compelling essay for why “my guy” is so clearly better than everyone else.  Or I can just admit that projecting player success is an INCREDIBLY hard thing to do and impossible to do perfectly.  In fact, the professional scouts have already tried to do that, and came up with VERY SIMILAR SCORES.

This is a similar point to the one I made in “The Bad GM Theory” post, and one I’ve likely made several times before that.  Let other teams pay a premium for “false control”.  In a draft with so many prospects grouped so closely together, let’s just admit that we don’t know, with any certainty, which is best.

Look back at the $20 game and pretend you have the first pick.  Do you take that pick? or do you trade it to the guy picking 4th, who is willing to give you $2 as payment for switching?

Trade down a few picks, take whatever compensation is available, and let someone else “choose first”.  Our odds of success will be the same, and we’ll pick up and extra pick or two in the process.

Please note that this only holds because we are looking at a tightly packed group of prospects.  Also, you might be saying, this is no different from the normal case for trading down, one that has been made many times before.

Let me finish by clearing that up.  The normal case for trading down is that “we want more picks” and “we’ll still get a good player”.  What I’m saying here is that our odds of getting the BEST PLAYER are no different at #4 than at #7 or #8.  So we can pick up those extra picks and NOT LOSE ANYTHING.

This year, at least, trading down does indeed offer a “free lunch”, and why would you ever turn that down?

Comparing Big Boards

UPDATE: The original post did not include the NFL.com big board.  I’ve added a graphic at the bottom that does.

Short post today, since the graphic took a while to put together.

It looks like all of the major outlet “Big Boards” have been finalized.  So now its time to compare them.  Below, I’ve created a graphic that shows the top 25 players on the board for 5 different sources: Kiper, Burke (SI.com), McShay, National Football Post, and my own TPR rankings.  The players are all color-coded in an effort to make it easier to see where they rank on each board.  I’ve also included some lines to help follow the top players.

Screen Shot 2013-04-17 at 12.01.30 PM

My goal here was to provide a single source for comparison, since I’ve found it difficult to remember where each writer ranked players.

Notes:

NFP provides the most varied rankings, which is a big advantage for us (since it helps balance the TPR system).  However, just because they’re different doesn’t mean they’re any better or worse.

Most people know by now that Ryan Nassib tops the entire board at NFP, but those rankings also differ significantly for Joeckel, Floyd, and Lane Johnson.  While Joeckel is ranked #1 in every other board here, he comes in just 11th at NFP.

– We see an interesting split regarding Jonathan Cooper.  Kiper, McShay, and Burke all have him ranked either 9th or 10th.  Meanwhile, both NFP and the TPR rankings drop him to 21-22.

– Tyler Eifert ranks in the top 15 in Kiper, McShay, and NFP’s board, but doesn’t even crack the top 25 in the other two.

– Eagles fans should keep an eye on Menelik Watson and Jamar Taylor.  Both make the top 25 of the TPR rankings, but aren’t included on any other board here.  That means they may be underrated (other guys aren’t accounting for low-risk, high-reward) and available close to the #35 pick (Eagles second rounder).  They also both play positions of need for the Eagles (OT and CB).

– For someone with VERY limited football experience, Ziggy Ansah’s evaluations are remarkably consistent.  This should be surprising since he’s widely regarded as the “rawest” prospect, meaning his evaluation requires the most projection and growth assumption.  I’d expect that to result in widely divergent opinions (as some should expect him to NOT reach his “potential”), but we don’t see that here.

With NFL.com:

Screen Shot 2013-04-17 at 1.50.43 PM

The Bad GM Theory

Today will be a bit high level/abstract, but I think it’s particularly important (given the Eagles draft standing) to talk about one of my favorite current theories regarding successful sports franchise management, namely: The Bad GM Theory (name needs some work).

First, we need to understand what makes a good/bad GM.  In general, it (like all multi-party actions in life) comes down to INFORMATION ASYMMETRY.  I may have discussed this before, so I apologize if I’m repeating myself.  In the NFL, every team is working within the same guidelines.  Everyone follows the same rules (unless you’re the Patriots) and is thus on a “level playing field”.  So how do teams get an advantage?  Two ways:

1) Develop better intelligence (i.e. get better information than everyone else).

2) Interpret public information better than everyone else.

The first option is what scouting is all about.  Teams hire staffs of professionals to go out and evaluate players.  A better scouting staff = better information = a big advantage.

The second part is talked about less often, but is arguably more important.  There is so much public information on every player, that the “better intelligence” angle is extremely difficult to pull off consistently.  Everyone has similar access to players.  Everyone watches the same tape.  I don’t think it’s a stretch to say that, for the most part, NFL teams are working with very similar information regarding individual player evaluation.  The key then is interpretation; what does that information mean?

The Eagles (and every other team) should repeatedly ask themselves one very important question: “What do I know that the other side doesn’t?”  In any particular deal/scenario, the team with the better information is likely to come out on top.  Hence the importance of recognizing Information Asymmetry.

There are two ways to view this, though.  The first and most obvious is to say: I need to be the best at interpreting and gathering intelligence, ensuring I have the advantage in every transaction.

Sounds simple enough, but it’s hard to be very good and only one team can actually be “the best”.

The other way to handle it is to look for teams with WORSE information.  This, as you can probably tell, is where I think teams should focus more energy.  Rather than try to be the absolute best, it seems far easier to me to just identify a subset of teams who are definitively WORSE at both gathering and interpreting information.

Once you’ve identified those teams, every decision should be made with an eye towards taking advantage of those organizations.

Think of it like poker.  If two professionals sit down at a random table in AC, are they likely to play “against” each other?  Or will they, for the most part, stay out of each other’s way and instead focus on the other 6 (or however many) people at the table?  You know, the people who are DEFINITELY worse than them at poker?

So how do you put this into practice?

Step one is accepting the assumption that you are an “average” GM.  It doesn’t matter if you are actually really good (in fact, by just accepting this first part I’d venture to guess you’ve made yourself above-average).  Step two is identifying GMs that are DEFINITELY worse than you are at talent evaluation.

Then it’s just a matter of engaging them.  For instance, you could call up one of these GMs and try to trade with them.

The key here is that rather than relying on something difficult/unlikely (you having the best information), you are relying on something far more reasonable (a bad GM making a bad decision).  You don’t have to be “good”, you just need the other guy to be as “bad” as he usually is.

What does this have to do with the Eagles/Draft?

First, it means that there is a decent chance the Eagles have no interest in one or more of the players drafted in the top 3.  It’s possible that, for the Eagles, the Jaguars and Raiders are both standing there like bodyguards, ready to “take a bullet” for the Eagles by making a poor draft choice.  Especially in a draft like this, with no clear-cut top prospects.

For example, let’s say the Eagles really want Ziggy Ansah.  The Jaguars take him.  By shear virtue of the Jaguars taking him, his quality as a prospect falls, in my estimation.

Also, let’s say a team like the Cardinals wants to trade up for the Eagles pick.  Do it, regardless of compensation.  After all, what’s more likely:

A) A team with a history of poor player evaluations/roster decisions making a bad trade (i.e. being the “loser”)

or

B) A team with a history of poor player evaluations/roster decisions being able to correctly discern which prospect (from a tightly packed bunch) is going to be both the best player of the bunch and good enough to outweigh the additional draft picks given up as compensation for moving up a few spots?

I thought so.  Now as I said at the top, this is very high-level and relatively abstract.  Front offices change, so you can’t just count on a bad franchise continuing to be bad.  Also, a bad GM can get lucky just like a good GM can get unlucky.  Above all else, this whole idea assumes that Roseman is not one of the aforementioned “bad GMs”.

Regardless, which of these headlines would you rather see during the draft:

– The Eagles made a HUGE draft-day trade with the Baltimore Ravens.

or

– The Eagles made a HUGE draft-day trade with the Detroit Lions.

Pretty obvious, no?  All I’m doing is extrapolating from that initial reaction.  To distill this entire post into one sentence, let me paraphrase Sun Tzu:

When your opponent is making a mistake, get the hell out of his way.

Or to make it more applicable, when going against a mistake-prone opponent, maximize the amount of opportunities he has to make a mistake.

Most transactions in the NFL are zero-sum games.  I’d rather bank on “losers” losing than on trying to out-think “winners”.

Come draft day, if I was Howie, I’d have the 5 worst franchises on the phone almost constantly, trying to act as their conduit for getting whomever they want.  Move up, move down, whatever; if the other team loses the trade, there’s a good chance I won.

 

 

 

Setting Expectations for the Draft

I posted last week about how we can compare this year’s prospect class to previous years and illustrated the system I will use going forward to do that.  However, it occurred to me that it would be of some value to modify the current system so that we do have a true apples-to-apples comparison with previous years.

I’ve done that and will use those results to illustrate the main idea of today’s post: accurately setting expectations for the draft.

Unfortunately, the draft structure lends itself very well to year-to-year comparisons (i.e. looking at the success of previous #4 picks).  However, in reality it doesn’t work like that.  Each draft class is distinct and wholly unrelated to the previous classes, meaning the quality of player available at #4 will differ greatly depending on the year.  But how greatly, and what does that mean for this year?

To answer that question, I first eliminated the NFP ratings from this year’s data (I don’t have it for previous years).  I then added the 2012 and 2010 prospects to the database and ran all the prospects through the same TPR formula.  Note I did not include 2011 because, for some ridiculous reason I can’t imagine, NFL.com’s draft tracker does not work for that year, meaning I don’t have the prospect ratings for the Cam Newton, A.J. Green, Patrick Peterson draft class.

Anyway, now we’ve got this year’s prospects compared side-by-side with the top prospects from 2012 and 2010, graded using the same scouting ratings and formula.  Here are the results, with current prospects highlighted yellow:Screen Shot 2013-04-15 at 11.34.59 AM

Notice the ratings and order of this year’s class is different from the current TPR system (due to the absence of NFP’s scouting data).  Also, while I will only be discussing the TPR rankings here, I’ve included a chart at the end of the post that sorts by average rating (so even if you think TPR is bullshit you can still find something interesting here).

As you can see, Luck, Bradford, and Griffin are far and away the best prospects from these three years.  Also fairly obvious is the fact that Luke Joeckel, this year’s #1 ranked player, is just the 9th best prospect here.

That’s what everyone means when they say there are no “elite” players in this year’s draft.

However, after the top subset of prospects, this year’s class takes over the list, meaning that there are a LOT of very good players here.  I know this point has been made repeatedly, but I wanted to show a very clear picture of exactly how this draft compares to previous years.

So what does that mean for the Eagles?

– First and foremost, it means trade back.  Almost regardless of compensation, if the Eagles can move back a few picks (staying in the top 10), the team should and likely will take that opportunity.

– The Eagles should still get a very good player.  Here’s where it will get tricky for fans.  If the Eagles stay at #4, whomever they select will be expected (by fans) to be a star from day one (or soon after).  It’s pretty clear, though, that such expectations would be unfair for just about all of these players.

Please, everyone must understand:

Luke Joeckel is not Joe Thomas

Star Lotulelei is not Gerald McCoy or Ndamukong Suh

Dee Milliner is not Patrick Peterson

It sucks (for the Eagles), but it’s true.  Anyone expecting that level of talent from the Eagles first pick is likely to be sorely disappointed.  However, take a close look at the chart above and it should be clear that the Eagles can still come out of this draft in good shape.  A number of prospects in this class are rated more highly than guys like Eric Berry, Joe Haden, Earl Thomas, Anthony Davis, etc…

Adding a player of that caliber is still a big upgrade and something we should all be excited about.

Other notes:

– By this measure, Brandon Graham was a better prospect than anyone the Eagles will be able to select this year…

– Eagles fans should be a bit higher on Dee Milliner.  Not perfect, but he’s a very good CB prospect.

– Picking Geno Smith at #4 would be crazy…and I think all the rumors are just misinformation.

– It’s possible that the Derrick Morgan, JPP, Brandon Graham DE run is among the best we’ve ever seen at that position.  Obviously depends on Graham’s transition, but all three of those players were steals on draft day.

– Not related to this post, but Tyler Wilson should be getting a lot more respect.

– Don’t sleep on Ziggy…with so much misinformation out there and rumors that the Eagles really like EVERYONE, I’m more intrigued by the LACK of reported interested in Ansah.

Finally, here is a chart of the same prospect set sorted by average scouting rating.  Similar story, though the names have shifted a bit:

Screen Shot 2013-04-15 at 12.04.40 PM

Overrated/Underrated Top Prospects

While I posted the full TPR rankings earlier this week, I didn’t go through them in any detail.   Today I’ll look at the players most effected by the formula.

First the fallers.  These are players whose consensus scouting ranking is HIGHER than their ranking in the TPR system.  As a result, these are players we expect to be OVERDRAFTED.  Now we need to be careful about the relative magnitude here.  For example, a ranking difference (as shown in the TPR Effect column) of just a few spots isn’t a big deal.  We’re mostly concerned with the larger movements, as they indicate a wide divergence between perceived value and actual value (as we’re attempting to quantify it here).

Here are the top fallers among the top 60 overall prospects:

Screen Shot 2013-04-12 at 9.22.47 AM

 

For Eagles fans, the first guy on the list (Cyprien) should be of interest.  Cyprien is a definite potential target for the team in the 2nd round.  By these rankings, taking him at #35 overall would be a slight reach, but nothing to get too upset over.  HOWEVER, it also shows that we shouldn’t be surprised if he goes towards the end of the first round.

We should all hope that somebody takes Matt Elam in the first round (where he’s been listed in several mock drafts).  Elam ranks as just the #5 overall safety by the TPR rankings, FAR below Cyprien, Eric Reid, and just behind D.J. Swearinger.

Other notes:

– Jarvis Jones and Sylvester Williams both drop from the mid-first round to the end of the first round or beginning of the second.  Both of these players have relatively large scouting rating standard deviations, meaning ESPN, NFL.com, and NFP have largely divergent opinions of each player.  Neither seem to be in play for the Eagles, but these guys are both  wild cards for draft day, in that they can go anywhere from the top 15 to the top half of the second round.

– Dion Jordan falls 4 spots.  While that’s not a huge amount on an absolute basis, it’s very meaningful for him, since he began ranked 4th overall.  Though he’s been a popular mock pick for the Eagles at #4, the rankings here show that would NOT be a good pick.

Now let’s look at the risers.  These are guys who are likely to be UNDERDRAFTED, and therefore may represent good value in the first two rounds of the draft.Screen Shot 2013-04-12 at 9.38.23 AM

Quarterbacks, obviously, feature prominently on this list. Despite a relatively low hit rate, the QB position still receives the largest benefit from this system.  The reward of hitting on one is so much larger than the reward of any other position that QBs tend to fly up the list (which we see in real life as well).

What’s interesting here is that Tyler Wilson gains the most and becomes the SECOND ranked QB, just ahead of Matt Barkley.  Most QB discussion has centered on Geno Smith, Ryan Nassib, Matt Barkley, and EJ Manuel.  According to these rankings though, Tyler Wilson should be getting a lot more attention.

– Towards the lower end, Ezekiel Ansah benefits, moving from #8 to the top 5.  Still not sure if he can be a 5-tech DE (I think he can), but he remains a dark hose candidate for the Eagles pick.  His ranking here suggests that wouldn’t be a stretch.

– Tank Carradine jumps 10 spots, from the end of the first round to the middle.  He is a player I’ve been secretly hoping would drop to the Eagles at #35, but his listing here suggests that’s unlikely.  If he does, it’d be an early candidate for steal of the draft.

 

 

Looking at Prospects on an Absolute Basis (not relative)

So now we have relative rankings for all of the top prospects in this year’s draft, but there are a couple of issues with the scores, namely:

– Each player is scored on a different scale (due to positional risk and impact modifiers)

– We can’t compare players from one year to the next, since those modifiers will change as the league changes.

Neither of those presents any problems for what the ranking’s main purpose is, but there is a way to address it, which I will now explain.  This will allow us to answer the question of “how good is a prospect?”, rather than just “who is the best prospect?”.

First let’s look at the scales.  As I mentioned, each position carries a different maximum score, depending on the amount of inherent risk at that position and its potential impact.  Here are the maximum sores by position:

Screen Shot 2013-04-11 at 11.05.05 AM

Note that these numbers are rounded for the sake of simplicity.  The only surprise for me is at the Safety position, which ranks near the bottom.  Basically, this is telling us that:

According to our Risk/Impact measures, the PERFECT QB prospect is better than the PERFECT DE prospect, and so on.  Again, the ranking of safeties surprises me, but that’s why I use the data, rather than my own rankings.

Now that we have the maximum scores for each position, we can take another step.  That is, we can find divide each player’s individual TPR grade (TPR seems more accurate than PVM at this point) by the total available points at his position.  For example:

Ziggy Ansah has a TPR grade of 93.6, out of a possible 103 points, giving him a % score of 91.3%.

This method of scoring has a couple of advantages.  It solves the problem of comparing prospects from different years while accounting for the fact that the league evolves.  It enables us to easily back out the positional impact and risk modifiers, while keeping individual risk. It also is a bit easier to understand, since it’s out of 100 and every player is on the same scale.

By looking at the % score, we get a better question of the ABSOLUTE value of each prospect, rather than just the RELATIVE value (though for the draft’s purposes RELATIVE is far more important).

So now let’s look at the top of the board again, this time with the % scores included. First I’ll show the top players sorted by TPR rank.  Then I’ll show them sorted by % score (“Pos % Score”).

Screen Shot 2013-04-11 at 11.20.18 AM

Screen Shot 2013-04-11 at 11.23.24 AM

This second chart will help to answer the question of “How strong is this draft?”.  Unfortunately, I do not have the complete data set for the past several years (can’t find NFP’s ratings).  With only 2 sets of ratings, the system loses a fair amount of value.  Additionally, I do not have the salary information from 2011-2012, which would result in different positional impact scores.  However, we’ll do the best we can with what we have, since I want to show an example of what we’ll be able to do from now on.  My guess is that, if included, NFP’s ratings would INCREASE the standard deviation of most players, LOWERING their overall score.

Here are the top 25 picks from last year:

Screen Shot 2013-04-11 at 11.41.32 AM

Again, since we don’t have NFP’s ratings, this isn’t an exact apples-to-apples comparison.  Regardless, we can see at the top of the board that Andrew Luck was a far better prospect than anyone available this year (not that we didn’t know that).

HOWEVER, after Luck, Griffin, and Kalil, this year’s draft class looks pretty good by comparison.  In fact, the average Positional % score of the top 25 players THIS year is slightly above the average for last year, even though last year includes Andrew Luck as a high outlier.

Other notes of interest:

– Dee Milliner appears to be a BETTER prospect than Morris Claiborne was last year.  This has been talked about a lot (Milliner not being a “top” CB prospect), but he scores better than Claiborne, who was drafted 6th overall last year.  Consequently, it really should be a surprise if Milliner goes top 5 this year, despite not having elite return skills.

– All three top DTs this year (Star, Floyd, and Richardson) score better than Fletcher Cox did last year.

– Ryan Tannehill would indeed be the top QB prospect if he was in this year’s draft.

– Andrew Luck is as close to a perfect prospect as we are ever likely to see.

– RG3 was a better QB prospect than Chance Warmack is a G prospect.

Tomorrow we’ll take a look at the overall rankings and next week I’ll see if I can do some side-by-side big board comparisons so we can see where guys like Kiper diverge from our board.

Who are the Riskiest/Safest Top Prospects?

If you haven’t seen the new Total Prospect Rankings, see either yesterday’s post or the PVM Rankings tab at the top.

There are a number of ways we can slice and dice this information, and over the next couple weeks I’ll look at a bunch of them.  Today, we’ll look at the “riskiest” prospects this year.  Note we are only looking at the top subsection of players (137 total, of which I posted 130), so we aren’t including players who are likely to be late round picks.

As I discussed yesterday, “risk” in the draft is composed of two components, the individual player’s risk and the larger positional risk, as quantified by the historic success of players drafted at each position.

First let’s look at the individual component.  Here is a chart showing the prospects with the highest standard deviations in their consensus ratings.  Note that the measure here is HALF the true standard deviation.  Also, for this chart I’ve only used Top 60 prospects.  The worse prospects tend to have higher standard deviations, so using the whole sample results in a bunch of guys that aren’t really worth talking about just yet.

The columns should be self-explanatory, but: “Consensus” is the average scouting score.  “.5 SD” is the measure we are looking at.  “Pos Miss Rate” is the historical failure rate for each position.  “Risk Adj” is the combined risk component, as described yesterday.

Screen Shot 2013-04-10 at 12.10.48 PM

Immediately, the two QBs at the top jump out.  EJ Manuel and Ryan Nassib, both potential targets for the Eagles in round two (or late round 1) carry very high “individual risk rates”.  The three scouting groups I’ve used have widely different opinions of these players.  Therefore, they are riskier choices.

Other notable inclusions on this list are:

– Sylvester Williams, DT.  Ranked 22nd overall by the Consensus Scores, he drops to 33 in the TPR system (due in part to his placement above).  He carries the 6th highest individual uncertainty score of all the top prospects.

– John Cyprien, S.  He is a popular target for the Eagles 2nd round pick, but does not fair well in the TPR system.  There is relatively wide disagreement among scouts about his ability, and while he ranks 30th in the Consensus Scores, he drops to 43rd in the TPR rankings.  Note that the Eagles 2nd round pick is nearly halfway between those two rankings, meaning he remains a viable option for the Eagles at pick #35.

– Towards the bottom, we can see Sharrif Floyd carries the highest individual uncertainty among Top 10 prospects.  This is part of the reason I am firmly in the Star>Sharrif camp.

Now here is the chart showing the players with the LOWEST individual risk grades:Screen Shot 2013-04-10 at 12.24.41 PM

This is perhaps the more interesting chart for Eagles fans, as it includes many of the potential targets for the 4th overall pick.

– Chance Warmack remains a pain in the ass.  I originally conceived of the positional adjustments in an effort to explain why Chance is a terrible use of resources in the Top 10. However, through two iterations he remains near the top of the TPR draft board.

Here I have to stress two things about Warmack that people aren’t mentioning enough:

1) He is the highest rated prospect by Consensus Score.

2) He has the lowest standard deviation, suggesting there is widespread agreement that he is the best prospect.

I’m close to the point of saying that our (and MY) preconceived notions about positional value may be blinding us to what should be an obvious assertion, namely: Chance Warmack should be a top pick.

I’m not there yet, but the entire idea here was to take subjectivity and bias out of the equation, and on that basis, Chance Warmack looks pretty good.

– Dee Milliner, Dion Jordan, and Star Lotulelei all place near the top of the board.  That means, on an individual basis, we should be more confident in their scouting grades then in the grades of players lower on the list.

How about Total Risk?

Now let’s look at the total risk component.  As described yesterday, the total risk component is weighted heavily to Positional Evaluative Error, with individual uncertainty included, but with less impact.

This is one area where I am not 100% comfortable with the model.  Should individual uncertainty carry more weight?  I don’t know, but maybe, and it’s something I’m thinking about as we get closer to the draft.

Anyway, here is a chart showing the Top 60 prospects with the HIGHEST risk components:Screen Shot 2013-04-10 at 12.34.53 PM

Nobody should be surprised to see EJ Manuel and Ryan Nassib at the top of the list.  A lot of individual uncertainty + a large positional risk rate = a big risk component.  These guys may become good/great players, but given where they will likely be drafted, they represent the riskiest picks in the entire draft.

Others of note:

– We already discussed Williams, Cyprien, Floyd.  For obvious reasons, they are included above.

– Keenan Allen is another one to note. Ranked 16th overall by Consensus Score, he is one of the “riskiest” top prospects, despite the fact that the TPR system only drops him to 19th overall.

While the guys above probably don’t seem familiar to most of you, they are all players that we’ll be seeing/talking about towards the bottom of the 1st round and through the 2nd round of the draft.  Might as well start familiarizing yourself with them now.

Now for the LEAST RISKY top prospects:Screen Shot 2013-04-10 at 12.41.59 PM

Not surprisingly, we see mostly offensive linemen at the top of the list.  The biggest name for Eagles fans is Eric Fisher, who is probably the most likely pick for the Eagles at #4.  Based on the current measure of risk that I’m using, Fisher is the 3rd SAFEST top prospect.

Some other things to keep in mind:

– Pay close attention to the CBs listed near the top of the list.  Guys like Rhodes and Taylor could be great pick-ups for the Eagles if they fall to the second round.

– Menelik Watson is another guy to keep an eye on.  It’s possible (though I think unlikely) that he’s available at #35 and, should the Eagles pass on Fisher at #4, would be a prime target for the team.

As I said, I’ll be looking at this info in a number of different ways, but please feel free to suggest anything in particular that you’d really like to see, either through twitter, email, or the comments.